When the Sharon government refused to receive a UN panel to investigate the violence in Jenin last
May, Foreign Minister Peres termed the very intention to start such an inquiry "a blood libel against
the Jewish people." This statement was made against the background of mounting anti-Jewish
incidents around the world, all of them immediate fallout of the violence in Israel/Palestine. Peres'
not-so-innocent goal was to emphasize the common fate shared by Israel and the Diaspora in order
to suggest that diaspora Jews who disagreed with Israeli policy were being traitors to their people.
Yet this connection between the Diaspora and Israel also reflects the obvious, but rarely
acknowledged, fact that Israel itself has become the main danger to the welfare of the Jewish
people.

As early as 1948, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt warned:

"Even if the Jews were to win the war … the 'victorious Jews' would live surrounded by an entirely
hostile Arab population, secluded inside ever threatened borders, absorbed by physical self-defense
… And all this would be the fate of a nation that—no matter how many immigrants it could still
absorb and how it extended its boundaries—would still remain a very small people greatly
outnumbered by hostile neighbors."

Her prophecy has sadly come true. The State of Israel has faced incessant violence since its
proclamation. Demographically, Israel's Jewish population is and will remain a tiny minority
facing the rapidly growing Arab masses, 40 percent of whom are today below the age of
fifteen. An island of wealth facing an ocean of poverty, Israel is condemned to live by the
sword if the Zionist structure remains intact. To survive even in the short term, Israel will
continue to need significant population inflows from abroad. But even if all the Jews of the
world were to move to Israel, this would only delay the showdown with its more numerous
and mostly hostile neighbors.

We must admit that structurally, i.e. independently of the impact of particular policies, the
interests of Israel and of the Diaspora are at loggerheads. Israel was created inter alia, to
offer the Jews physical safety. Today the State of Israel adversely affects the physical safety
of the Jews, both within its borders and elsewhere. In spite of the might of Israel's armed
forces, Israel is the only place in the world where a Jew can be killed just for being a Jew.
Today the life of a Jew is in greater danger in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv than in Paris or Berlin
or even in Damascus or Tehran.

Moreover, the chronic conflict engendered by the establishment of the State of Israel has
spread waves of Jew-hatred to most Muslim and Arab nations. The current intifada ignited
sparks of anti-Semitism in many parts of the world, including Western Europe, which had been
free of anti-Semitism for several decades. Indeed, the chronic character of the Israel/Palestine
conflict was an important, albeit not the only, cause of September 11. This observation does
not apportion blame or justify terrorism; it simply states an obvious, albeit little articulated,
connection between the creation and perpetuation of Israel as a Jewish nation-state and the
unprecedented spread of regional violence to the rest of the world. Rwandans, Bosnians, or
black South Africans did not spread violence to other parts of the world. Palestinians,
frustrated by their fight against Israel, did.

It is not only our physical safety, but also our moral sensitivity, that has been adversely
affected by the creation of Israel against the will of the ambient population. The never-ending
bloody violence has numbed our sense of compassion, one of the three defining qualities that the
Talmud attributes to the Jew—alongside timidity and propensity to do good (BT Yevamot, 79a).
It was painful to hear Paul Wolfowitz, one of the most pro-Israel members of the American
administration, booed by thousands of Jews assembled in Washington last April when he dared
mention "innocent victims among the Palestinians."

It would be a folly to mortgage the future of world Jewry on the fragile State of Israel. A possible
violent demise of this valiant remnant of European nationalism in the Middle East could spell a
disaster for Judaism and the Jews. Diaspora Jewry must acknowledge that it finds Israel's
militancy, callousness, and chutzpah repugnant, a far cry from the values of Judaism. Instead of
blindly supporting the Zionist ideal of a nation-state for Jews, we should reconsider the best course
for preserving and strengthening Jewish life in both the Land of Israel and the Diaspora. It is too
early to define the place reserved for the State of Israel and for Zionism in history. While for
many Jews the desirability of the State of Israel constitutes an article of faith, this new faith in an
ethnic state is not unshakable. It is hard to justify the State of Israel as a tool to enhance the
spiritual and material welfare of the Jews and, particularly, to offer them a sense of physical safety.
As violence continues, we should find the courage to ask: Was the idea of a Jewish state a viable
one? Is it not the very nature of the State of Israel as a state for the Jews that fuels and
perpetuates the conflict?

Opposition to Zionism

The most principled criticism of the Zionist idea has come not so much from Arab writers as from
Jewish scholars who have opposed the idea of a Jewish state for over a century. The Zionists
viewed the Jews as a nation in the modern European sense of the word. In reaction to
nineteenth-century theories of race (theories which ultimately led to Nazism), Zionism based its
definition of the Jew on biological provenance, and sought to become what one European rabbi
called "a purely nationalist-racist movement without the least commonality with religion." Most
rabbinical authorities reacted to the emergence of Zionism in the late nineteenth century with
undisguised hostility. Prior to the establishment of the Jewish State, rabbis and scholars routinely
objected to the political appropriation by the Zionists of spiritual concepts such as "Jerusalem,"
"Zion," or "Land of Israel."

Zionism postulates that Jewish history is essentially a sequence of expulsions, massacres, and forced
conversions. According to this view, the Shoah is the ultimate proof of the untenability of Jewish
diasporas, rather than a unique tragedy interrupting the progression towards a more tolerant and
pluralistic society. Most Zionists see no intrinsic value in maintaining Jewish continuity beyond the
borders of Israel. For them, the traditional model of autonomous diasporas possessing a common
spiritual focus has largely given way to a center-periphery model with the State of Israel assuming
political, administrative, and representative functions of a center with respect to diaspora Jews.

Consequently, Israeli policies often convey the impression that Israel represents Jews from other
countries. Political use by Israeli leaders of the Judaic term "the People of Israel" (Am Yisrael)
tends to blur distinctions between Israeli and diaspora Jews, presenting the latter as "temporarily
away from the country." Israel has domesticated diaspora leaders to the extent that they now act
as lobbyists for Israel rather than as representatives of Jews. For many of these leaders, Zionism
has replaced Judaism as a religion.

The characterization of the Jewish people in terms of ethnicity and, particularly, the attempt to
cast Israel as a secular European nation-state designated as the home for that ethnic group, mark
a major departure from Jewish tradition. Since the Diaspora began twenty-five centuries ago, the
Jewish tradition has defined Jews as a nation only in the sense—and to the extent—that Jews
remain loyal to Torah. According to the tradition (solidly based on scriptural evidence), there is
little meaning to a Jewish nation without Judaism. Just as the Muslim concept of umma is based on
the loyalty to the Koran and transcends boundaries of nation-states, the Jewish concepts of umma,
Am Yisrael, or Kelal Yisrael refer to communities that have the Torah as their common denominator;
they are not confined to any particular territory, let alone to a nation-state.

As for the Land of Israel, the Torah posits that the land is entrusted to the Children of Israel only if
the Jewish people live up to the standards enunciated in the Torah: to practice morality, to pursue
justice, and to obey certain agricultural rules. The nature of our relationship to the Land of Israel is
therefore different from that of other nations to their respective motherlands. Unlike the images
common in other cultures, Israel is not a mother who would welcome her son whatever his misdeeds.
Rather, Israel is portrayed as a bride who can reject her partner (or even, in Leviticus 18:28, a land
that can "vomit its inhabitants") if she disapproves of his behavior. The best known part of the
Jewish prayer book is, perhaps, Shema Israel. This is what we read when we recite it three times
a day: "Beware! Lest you let your heart be seduced, go astray, and worship alien deities and bow
down to them. Then, the Divine anger will be awakened, and he will block the sky and there will be
no more rain. The Land will not yield harvest, and you will disappear from the good land that G-d
gives you." The link that the Jews have with the Land of Israel is therefore contractual rather than
organic. It is contingent on their loyalty to the Torah, and this can be seen in many synagogues on
the day of Shavuot (Pentecost), when a special marriage contract drawn between the Jews and the
Torah is read for all to hear.

In line with this idea of contract, the Jewish tradition attributes the exile of the Jews from the Land to
their abandoning Torah commandments. The tradition does not view Jews as hapless victims, but
rather as makers of their own fate. Maimonides and other classical sources indicate that the way
back to the Land of Israel is Teshuvah, i.e. repentance and return to the commandments. Since the
reason for exile is not attributed to the superior strength of the Roman legions, the redress for exile
is not and should not be sought in developing a mightier army. In fact, the Talmud
(BT Ketubot, 111a) refers to oaths that the Jews were to swear prior to their second exile, in which
they are enjoined not to rebel against the nations and to re-occupy the Land of Israel by force.
Given this tradition, some Judaic scholars see Israel's military exploits not as a sign of impending
messianic redemption but rather as a blasphemous act of rebellion.

Opposition to Zionism has not disappeared since the time when Zionism was a minority movement
shunned by most Jews. Most principled opposition continues to come from certain Hasidic groups,
centered in Jerusalem and New York. They believe that the Zionist state, born in sin for which it has
never repented, has no legitimacy in terms of Jewish history. They believe that Jews had lived in the
Land of Israel before the state, and they will remain there after it comes to an end. According to
them, the State of Israel is an impediment to the messianic redemption. While most Mitnaggedim
(non-Hasidic Jews) take a less militant position, they also reject the legitimacy of the State of Israel.
According to the editor of the newspaper Yated Hane'eman: "Our participation in the state and its
institutions is performed due to the pressures of the time and the force of circumstance, similar to
our behavior under foreign regimes outside of the land. It may be defined as stealing into the enemy
camp." It is no wonder that the late Rabbi Eliezer Schach reportedly prayed daily that the State of
Israel should disappear without harm befalling a single Jew. It is quite significant that the main street
of Bnei Brak, the citadel of traditional Judaism in Israel, was recently renamed from Herzl Street to
Rabbi Schach Street.

Uses of Violence

"In the long run," wrote Arendt when the idea of a Jewish state became dominant in Zionist circles in
the mid 1940s, "there is hardly any course imaginable that would be more dangerous, more in the
style
of an adventure… It will not be easy either to save the Jews or to save Palestine in the twentieth
century: that it can be done with categories and methods of the nineteenth century seems at the very
most highly improbable." Indeed, Israel's attempts to suppress Palestinian resistance, which provoke
worldwide protests today, would have been perfectly acceptable to European nations of the
nineteenth century. The Zionists' refusal to heed the prognosis about the durability of Arab
resistance
to the Jewish state may be seen as "a triumph of the will" or, conversely, as a major failure. Jews
used to believe in the power of their ideas, unsupported by material power. It appears that
nowadays Israeli leaders cling to material power for want of ideas.

It is often said that Herzl's vision of a state for the Jews came to life in spite of an inhospitable
terrain and the implacable hostility of the local inhabitants. However, it may well be that it is
precisely this implacable hostility that forged the new Hebrew nation in Palestine. Since the
Zionists discarded the Jewish religion as a common denominator of the ingathering exiles, a
shared "fear of the Arabs" became the ultimate factor of national unity. Resorting to education
as the primary tool of forging "the new man," Zionists made consistent ideological use of the
military conflict, a natural consequence of their self-serving vision of Palestine as "a land
without a people for a people without a land."

When Jewish babies are killed in the West Bank or Gaza, most Israelis are outraged.
However, more than a few also wonder what kind of parents would endanger their children
by keeping them in Hebron or Netsarim. This sacrificial rite is beginning to awaken doubts
as to the very nature of the State of Israel, which had caused hundreds of human sacrifices
from Jews and their neighbors well before it was established, and tens of thousands since.
Was it wise to establish it? Is it worth defending with heavy sacrifices? These questions, quite
unimaginable in other countries, are hardly rhetorical in Israel. But it is a fact that the majority
of the Jews, on whose behalf the State of Israel was ostensibly established, enjoy more tranquil
lives elsewhere and are reluctant to join their brethren in Israel, and not only because of fear of
wars. Zionist discourse has convinced many diaspora Jews that it is Israel that ensures their
safety and welfare from far afield. This is an erroneous and dangerous belief. Erroneous
because it ignores the structural conflict of interests between Israel and the Diaspora, and
belittles the progress of human rights that makes Jews equal and active citizens of their countries.
Dangerous because it lures diaspora Jewry into a mental and a physical trap.

Residual nostalgia for Zionist exploits largely explains many Israelis' reluctant approval of the
settlers, whom they tend to admire from afar. The settlers are indeed "the last Zionists," whose
messianic fervor is genuine and impressive. They are "the tail that wags the dog," that makes
the retention of the territories the main preoccupation of successive Israeli governments. The
settlement momentum is intrinsically expansive, since it relies on religious determinism that
deifies the State and sanctifies the Occupation. The settlers accuse those who argue that the
conflict can be solved by evacuation of the West Bank and Gaza of hypocrisy. They claim
that there is no moral difference between Jewish settlement in Hebron and in Tel Aviv. And it
appears that this view is gaining ground. Why should one rid Hebron of Jews but leave them in
Jerusalem's neighborhoods of Katamon or Baka, which used to be no less Arab prior to 1948?
Why should one oppose Israeli occupation of Hebron and condone the destruction of an Arab
village, replaced by the University of Tel Aviv—nowadays, ironically, the citadel of liberalism
and pacifism? If Jewish settlement is illegitimate in Gaza why is it legitimate in Jaffa or Haifa?
Such questions convey a powerful message: We are all in the same boat. They argue that the
legitimacy of the entire Jewish presence in the Land of Israel is in jeopardy once you start to
examine its recent record carefully. This polemic strategy, aided by the sense of physical
insecurity, keeps large segments of the Israeli population hostage to fear. Yet it also
contains a certain truth.

Embarrassment and Double Standards

Israel's military operations, particularly against civilians, have embarrassed Jews both in Israel
and in the Diaspora for many decades. Since Israel promotes itself as the representative of the
Jews, and most diaspora Jewish leaders enthusiastically support this claim, the State of Israel is
often associated with Jews everywhere. Jews outside of Israel are thus put in a difficult situation
of defending the morally indefensible, of bending their ethical standards in order to justify Israel's
actions in Bethlehem, Jenin, or Beirut. Indeed, Israel routinely, and perhaps inevitably for any
state, acts against the morality embodied in Judaism. At the same time, since there is nothing
but Judaism that distinguishes diaspora Jews from their fellow citizens in different countries,
this blanket defense of Israel seriously discredits Judaism.

Conceptual disparities between Israel and the Jewish diasporas become more pronounced
since the countries with sizable Jewish communities have all adopted a liberal system of social
and political values. It is quite common in Israel to talk in anti-liberal, anti-democratic terms; for
example, there are public discussions about building Jewish neighborhoods or settling Jews in
the Galilee so that Arab citizens do not outnumber their Jewish compatriots in the region. Israeli
official documents routinely identify the bearer as a Jew or a non-Jew. Structural segregation
of Jews from non-Jews is common in Israel. So is occupational discrimination, all of which is
justified by the Herzlian denomination of Israel as a state for the Jews.

However, in the context of Western societies, it would be inconceivable to practice ethnic or
religious discrimination in such a manner. One could imagine an international outcry if the Front
National mayor of a French town were to promote a public housing development designated
solely for Catholics. One of Israel's dailies wryly observed that Le Pen would be considered a
bleeding-heart centrist in the Israeli political spectrum. Israel's discriminatory practices, while often
opposed by the country's Supreme Court, conflict with the liberal values that underpin the stability
and welfare of Jewish diasporas around the world. It is only a matter of time before diaspora
leaders, at least those who overtly identify with the State of Israel, will face the challenge of
explaining their obvious double standard.

The primacy of the State is a dangerous belief to hold. A few decades after the Shoah, Jews
remember what happens when the raison d'état becomes a transcendental principle that supersedes
individual morality. It may be illusory and even dangerous to confuse the profane centrality of
Israel with the sacred centrality of the land; in order to affirm the first aspect one has to reject or
distort the second one, and vice versa.

A garrison state inhabited by a desperate population and armed with nuclear weapons faces the
danger of a regional, perhaps a world war. Zionism has brought about an unending confrontation
with Palestinian Arabs. This cycle of violence has become a serious threat: it may spell the violent
demise of the State of Israel and, more importantly, a spiritual and psychological crisis for
Judaism. As some foresaw over fifty years ago, it appears increasingly unrealistic to preserve
"the state for the Jews," an adventurous idea to begin with, against the violent opposition of the
Palestinians, whose nationalist dispossession by the Zionists remains at the root of the conflict. Of
course, Israel's army is capable of defeating the Palestinians, but such a "victory" would not bring
peace any closer. Many Israeli generals have learned this the hard way, and, once in retirement,
openly decry the use of force in settling the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Out of the Impasse

The military gains of the last fifty years seem to evaporate as the situation on the ground between
the Jordan and the Mediterranean reverts to 1948, when an ethnic conflict for the control of the land
intensified between Jews and Arabs. In 2002, just as in 1948, there is no clear concept of national
borders, and it is ethnic rather than political factors that play most potently in the entire area. A
growing number of Israel's Arab citizens identify with their Palestinian brethren while the State of
Israel often treats Arab Israelis as if they were enemy aliens. The euphoria that followed victory in
the Six-Day War, and which seemed to vindicate the Zionists' vision and practice, has vanished
altogether.

After decades of conflicting nationalist efforts from both sides, it is the entire area from the Jordan
to the sea, not just the West Bank and Gaza, that requires a solution. New Jerusalem suburbs of Gilo
or East Talpiot, Jewish cities of Ariel or Emanuel built on the lands conquered in 1967, are hardly
different from cities in Israel proper. Their evacuation in an eventual territorial settlement would be a
human drama of major proportions. "Transferring" Arab population into Jordan and Egypt, an option
accepted by about one-half of Israelis, would be equally cruel, senseless, and probably impossible.
The partition or separation that some Israeli policy-makers, including former Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, continue to support is no longer feasible since Jews and Arabs are too interspersed across
the entire disputed territory.

The frustration of the Palestinian Arabs, who are deprived of most avenues of political expression,
has naturally developed into a fixation on national independence à l'israélienne. Yet another
nation-state—a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza—may only cause more pain and rancor.
Dismantlement of settlements, forced transfers of population and other usual appurtenances of
establishing nation-states in ethnically heterogeneous areas would likely ensue. Rather than a new
nation-state, a liberal political structure based on citizens' equal rights and, consequently, their
self-interest, may have more chances to succeed.

Israelis of very different political views, such as the nationalist Moshe Arens, a former defense
minister, and the more conciliatory Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, agree
that separation of the Jews from the Palestinians is just a myth that regularly comes to the surface
after major acts of terror. In the same sense, surveys show that Israelis and Palestinians expect to
maintain strong economic ties. Moreover, conflicts are easier to settle between neighbors than
between nations.

Abrahamia: An Alternative to Ethnic Nationalism

One promising arrangement could be a confederation of independently governed areas or cantons,
to be established in the territory between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. Abrahamia
(or Ibrahimia) may be a good name for the new confederate state since it would recall an
important common ancestor recognized by Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Such a state could be
modeled after Canada or Switzerland. Good use could be made of elements of the Ottoman rule,
which had managed diversity and preserved peace in the region far better than most of its successor
states (be it Serbia, Turkey, Israel, or Lebanon). Democratic confederate structures tend to
moderate ethnic or national tensions. Abrahamia could consist of cantons sovereign in matters of
culture, education, worship, internal security, and local law. Such a structure would also enable
Orthodox Jews and secular Hebrews, whose relationship is also profoundly acrimonious, to live
their lives according to their customs and beliefs, without the irritating interventions of the state.

Foreign affairs, defense, monetary matters, and communication would be entrusted to a
confederate government elected by all citizens. The sensitive issue of defense could be resolved
by stages. During the first years the armed forces should remain mostly under the control of the
Jewish cantons since Jews, not Arabs, have been threatened with the prospect of being "thrown
into the sea" by neighboring countries. But the army, a bulwark against foreign aggression, should
be prohibited from being used as a police force within the confederation. Cantonal police units
and a nominal confederate police, initially aided by an international contingent, should maintain
public order and ensure peaceful relations between diverse cantons. As memories of the bitter
past recede into history—and this may take less time than many imagine—the defense forces
should fully incorporate all citizens.

The Law of Return, which now allows any Jew in the world to become a citizen of Israel upon
arrival (and sometimes even before), should be broadened to include Palestinian Arabs who
would be entitled to reclaim their homes or obtain compensation for lost property. To do so, the
lands held by the Jewish National Fund, over 90 percent of the total territory, should be sold
without discrimination to Jews and Arabs. Compensation for lost property would constitute a
major source of funds to help Arabs buy real estate and reduce the existing development gap
between the two groups. Economic disparities fuel violence no less than nationalist passions,
but when the economic divide coincides with the ethnic one, violence is simply unavoidable.
Income gaps must be bridged for such a confederation to take root. Just as a German may now
freely buy a property in Alsace after thousands died in wars disputing that territory, a Palestinian
Arab should acquire equal rights and obligations, and be free to settle wherever he can rent or
legally acquire property. This will give him, currently the most disenfranchised, a real stake in the
success of the confederation.

Similarly, those Jews who consider it a religious commandment to populate the entire Land of
Israel should be free to settle anywhere between the Jordan and the sea, by legal means of course
and without any special privileges. For this to happen, individual safety and individual rights of
citizens should become the main priority of the new federation.

The majority of secular Israelis who simply want "to be a free people in our land" (as Israel's
anthem now puts it) can continue to live "Israeli style" in their cantons. Confederate authorities
should do nothing to ensure their Jewishness, since matters of worship and education will be
exclusive privileges of the constituent cantons. Such an arrangement will not only alleviate the
conflict between Jews and Arabs, it will also eliminate the tension that the State of Israel has
fomented trying to subject its Jewish citizens to the strictures of religious law.

Details of such a confederation may take a while to work out, and even longer to implement.
At this point it is a suggestion, an outline of an idea that breaks the cycle of ethnic exclusivity
and ends the bloody zero-sum game. It is important to move Israeli and Palestinian political
thinking away from the notion of nation-state towards the concept of confederation, an idea that
was quite popular in both camps prior to 1948, and, according to recent surveys, is still popular
among many Palestinians.

A Role for World Jewry

After five decades of exasperating conflict in the Middle East, world Jewry can play a major
role in transforming the current situation along the proposed lines. Many Western Jews have
been active for years in diverse rapprochement activities that bring Arabs and Hebrews,
Muslims, Christians, and Jews together. They run joint prayer sessions and interconfessional
discussions, even a joint Jewish-Muslim program to teach tolerance on the basis of respective
religious texts. European and American Jews have brought expertise, commitment, and
even-handedness to a number of non-governmental projects that foster understanding and
respect of difference. Most of these joint activities have survived the current upsurge of
violence, which in itself is a sign of their success. Jewish academics, businesspeople,
psychologists, rabbis, and social workers from various countries have helped the cause of
tolerance in Israel for years, and their role, as well as that of members of the Palestinian
diasporas, can only gain in importance in the new confederation.

Diaspora Jews should help transform the structurally fragile State of Israel into a more stable
and viable political configuration. They should make their real voices heard in the European
Union, Russia, and the United States. The vast majority of Jews are citizens of these political
entities, which gives their governments more than a geo-strategic interest in settling the
Arab-Israeli dispute. These governments, particularly when encouraged by their respective
Jewish communities, could try to convince the Israeli public to transform the nation-state and the
territories it occupies into a confederation that would ensure the safety of all its inhabitants.
They can also make it clear to the Palestinians that such a confederation, rather than a quilt-like
nation-state criss-crossed by Israeli highways, is in their best long-term interest. The challenge
of making this conceptual shift is substantial. But it must be met in order to free our thinking of
the murderous nationalist stranglehold.

At the same time, measures shall be devised to offer Israeli Jews a refuge in various diasporas.
The feeling that they have nowhere to go, that Israel is the last frontier, that only Israel can
offer Jews physical safety, has fuelled despair not only among Israeli Jews but also among many
Jews who choose to remain in the Diaspora. These are vestiges of Zionist myths that have to
be reassessed in pragmatic, rather than ideological, terms. The possibility of a major military
flare-up, perhaps including weapons of mass destruction, together with the current terrorist
violence may push many Israeli Jews to look for refuge elsewhere. It would be tragically
irresponsible of Jewish communities to insist that Israelis should fight to the bitter end. Those
governments that are most likely to offer refuge to Israeli Jews must understand that, by
offering a choice to Israel's Jews to rebuild their lives in their countries, they reduce the degree
of despair and weaken the incentives for violence in the region.

A two-pronged approach, on the one hand encouraging the transformation of the nation-state of
Israel into an Abrahamia based on equality of opportunity and, on the other hand, offering Israel's
Jews an option of settling in other industrial countries, is likely to reduce violence and to
encourage stability. It will weaken one of the most enduring conflicts of our age and will help
restore Judaism as the focus of Jewish existence. Interminable (and sterile) discussions of the
latest political and military moves in Israel dominate the daily experience of most Jews. This
should cease, leaving Jews the peace of mind to face important issues of Judaism that have been
eclipsed by news bulletins from the Middle East. The Jewish return to history on-board a tank
has only endangered Jews, in body and in spirit. Shedding nationalist illusions of power should
enable Jews to focus on another kind of return to history: a return to the Torah with its manifold
interpretations and hope for all humanity. If we believe the Jewish tradition, this will also be the
best way to ensure Jewish presence in the Land of Israel.