Time
to persuade Europe debt write-down is needed
Ireland has to convince the ECB
to share the burden imposed on taxpayers
even if it means considering a
unilateral decision....
By BRIAN LUCEY
Irish Times http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0215/1224289816780.html
I RECENTLY had coffee with a former
colleague who is now working in the financial
services industry in Germany. He was at pains
to stress that the general tenor of the
German press, even among the tabloids, was
that although Ireland had been stupid,
feckless, and perhaps somewhat arrogant, it
was in general a well-run European country
that was at least trying, painfully, to get
out of the hole it had in part dug for itself.
He felt there was a degree of sympathy for
the Irish, and the German taxpayer would
understand if the Irish, having made a
genuine effort, required the European
partners to take some of the burden.
While anecdotal, this reflects the fact
that at heart our European partners,
certainly at individual level, are fair and
decent people. Two and a half years into this
catastrophic banking crisis, it is clear that
there have been sequential policy failures at
European and domestic level.
At domestic level, the litany of failure
is too long and dismal to reiterate. At
European level, it is clear that the decision
not to allow the Government, even as late as
the second half of 2010, to impose losses on
senior bondholders has resulted in the
European Central Bank (ECB) becoming more
deeply entangled in the Irish banking crisis
than was thought possible.
The ECB has in excess of 100 billion
extended to domestic banks. The Irish Central
Bank has extended more than 50 billion.
The only reason money flows from ATMs is that
it is being provided by the ECB.
The decision by the ECB and
although this has never been explicitly
articulated it has never been denied
appears to have been a quid pro quo. In
return for the Irish authorities not imposing
losses on senior bondholders, the ECB would
continue to fund Irish banks.
The consequence of splitting the liquidity
problem, being solved by the ECB, from
solvency problem, being fixed by the Irish
taxpayer shovelling untold tens of billions
of euro into banking black holes, is that the
two problems have become entwined.
Irish banks cannot get liquidity from
international markets because they are
fundamentally insolvent. Until this is solved,
the system is stuck see the analysis
on this by Arthur Beesley in yesterdays
Irish Times .
Above and beyond all this lies the fact
that at its heart the euro is a political,
rather than an economic, experiment. Any
solution must therefore also lie in politics.
It is generally agreed that the terms and
conditions of the bailout, in particular that
part of it emanating from our European
partners, are such as to make it incredibly
difficult for the State to avoid significant
and unnecessary cuts.
We must therefore negotiate a political
solution to the banking crisis, and this must
involve the writing down not just of the
interest rate we pay on the bailout, but the
actual amount of money we are borrowing.
Recent research by Reuters has indicated
that changing interest rates over the period
during which the bailout is drawn down will
not have significant effects on the overall
debt/income dynamics. All research indicates
that the fundamental drivers of sovereign
interest rates are domestic fiscal imbalances.
Freed from the burden of having to adjust
our tax and spend not just for fiscal
imbalances but also to pay the private debts
of bankers, the State can much more quickly
find itself moving towards long-term
financial stability.
Very crudely, if one-third of the bailout
is for the banks, then one-third of the
adjustment per annum can be seen as going not
towards reduction of our fiscal deficit but
to paying off these private debts.
Using the same ratios to get our fiscal
house in order will result in Ireland being
able to return to the international capital
markets with a cleaned up national balance
sheet much sooner than is expected.
In the political negotiations that will
have to take place in the coming months, we
have to remember that we are not powerless.
Negotiation is about give and take. If we are
asking our European partners to write down
some of our debts, the part we foolishly took
on from private debt holders, what are we
bringing to the table? It is very clear that
there is no question of our 12.5 per cent
corporate tax rate being up for discussion.
There are other ideas which we cannot carry
through.
For example, Fine Gael has floated the
idea of borrowing not from the ECB but from
the US Federal Reserve. This would expose the
ECB as being utterly unable to keep its house
in order, with deleterious consequences for
the euro.
Or there is the alternative being proposed
that we unilaterally impose losses on senior
bondholders. Another alternative is that the
Minister for Finance and we do still
have one actually exercises the powers
which he has belatedly acquired.
We see with Anglo and Irish Nationwide
that the proposal is in effect to hollow
these banks out, transferring their deposits
and leaving the senior bondholders with the
remaining carcass. There is no reason in
principle that this could not be done to
other banks.
The problem from the ECBs
perspective is that this would give a clear
signal to the overleveraged European banks,
and to the pension fund and long-term
investors who purchased the senior bonds,
that their losses would have to be taken on
board. This would result in extensive rapid
deleveraging of the European financial system.
This deleveraging, all agree, will have to
take place.
It is surely in everybodys interests
that when it takes place, it takes place in
an orderly fashion. And this is where the ECB
has to come in. Its role is to act as lender
of last resort. It is not to provide
unlimited lines of credit to bankrupt private
banks. The ultimate lender of last resort
function is to provide sufficient liquidity
to the system, through a variety of means
including printing money, to act as a cushion.
There is an institutional, as well as
governance, reluctance to countenance
inflation in the ECB. That is admirable, but
too rigid a policy is as calamitous as too
flexible.
We have political power and we should use
it. Even if the Government is forced to
consider a unilateral decision; and I would
favour that if we begin movement towards that
using the powers of the Minister for Finance,
the ECB will not cut off emergency liquidity.
To do so would expose it as a neocolonial
power.
I do not believe that it is
such. Irish banks borrowed foolishly from
European institutions. European institutions
lent bullishly to Irish banks. The solution
to date has been for the Irish taxpayer take
on all of the adjustment. Time to call a halt.
