The shaping of
cultures
By Dr. Azmi Bishara
Arabic Media Internet Network
31 August 2006
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=36780&NrIssue=1&NrSection=3
When you take a look around the Arab world today, what
do you see?
You see sons being groomed for monarchical succession in
republics that are still caricatures of Bonapartism and
Mameluke despotism. Ironically, these heirs apparent
always begin their careers by condemning corruption, yet
they are one of the foremost manifestations of
corruption.
You see CNN`s Rolf Blister questioning the Iraqi
president as though he were on trial: `Do you recognize
Israel or not?` Nur Al-Maliki squirms under the
interrogation, unable to pluck up the courage to say that
that`s the last thing on his mind at a time when his
country is falling apart. But recognition of Israel is
what the American media thinks is important about Iraq,
and will continue to think even after no walls are left
standing.
There is the division into regional axes, with political
leaders changing positions as though they were playing
musical chairs. One day they`ll deride Arab nationalism
and Arab identity if it is used to promote modernism, to
resist Israel or combat the American drive to partition
Iraq. The next day they`ll turn around and use these
concepts against Iran. Just to hear a Saudi official
defending Arab identity makes your head spin.
There is the Palestinian government under siege,
Palestinian society being destroyed. International
delegations meet the Palestinian president and snub the
democratically elected Palestinian government, while in
Lebanon they meet the government and snub the president.
Washington could not order non-Arab countries such as
Turkey or Russia not to receive elected Hamas officials
but it has no problem laying down the law with Arab
governments. The same governments which attacked
Hizbullah because of its Shia affiliation are the same
ones that attack Sunni-affiliated Hamas. Such are the
inconsistencies of the pro-American axis.
You see the promotion of Resolution 1701 as an
achievement even though it is much worse than 1559, and
the Lebanese resistance condemned for its Syrian and
Iranian connections and for having brought trouble to
Lebanon. Yet when Syria and Iran celebrate the victory of
this `Syrian-Iranian` resistance movement they are
accused of intervening in Lebanese affairs. As for the
resistance`s Arab enemies, they either question whether
there was a victory at all or they attribute it to the
Lebanese government.
Even more worrying is the unprecedented drive to inflame
sectarian discord and drive a wedge between Sunni and
Shia Muslims, as though they were mutually hostile tribal
groups rather than adherents to differing Islamic
doctrines. In the past, non-democratic governments based
their legitimacy upon a doctrine of national unity that
they were uniquely poised to embody. Now we see non-
democratic regimes fuelling sectarian strife and national
disunity in order to perpetuate themselves.
In contrast to the foregoing, we can take heart in the
Arab people`s rejection of the sectarian bait. Popular
support for the Lebanese resistance was widespread,
proving that Arab identity is alive in spite of
everything. Arab popular support for the predominantly
Shia Lebanese resistance was at least as strong as it was
for the Sunni Taliban at the time of the American
invasion of Afghanistan. When it comes to hostility
towards American and Israeli policies, Arab ties prevail
over sectarian ones.
People were greatly impressed by the model the Lebanese
resistance set and by its ability to deliver a stunning
blow to the Israeli assault and to anti-Arab stereotypes.
This impression has set in motion a fermentation that
will have far-reaching effects in the long run, and this,
too, is positive. It should now be clear to all that the
Arab public is not interested in agreements with Israel
that are prejudicial to the Arabs in general, and to the
Palestinians in particular.
I demonstrated my respect and sympathy for the resistance
during its ordeal and the jubilant aftermath. I stood by
it when others remained silent because under such
circumstances moral support must take precedence. Even
now it is important to realize that the war against the
resistance is not over, which is why one must bear in
mind the source of any criticism. Enemies of the
resistance have aired objections that could reasonably be
accepted by the movement`s supporters were they not
obviously aimed to undermine the resistance. The
following criticisms are offered by way of support of the
resistance.
I believe that the Iranian-supported Lebanese party
should not act towards Iran as communist parties acted
towards Moscow in the days of the Soviet Union. Iran is
not infallible, and it is certainly less than innocent in
Iraq, where it is helping to promote sectarian strife in
order to further its own regional ambitions. One can
understand Hizbullah`s predicament because of its
material dependence on Iran. However, the party still has
considerable room for maneuver because of the popular
support it has received in the Arab world, which it can
turn to its advantage without having to lose Iran`s
support.
Nor should we expect Hizbullah to get all worked up over
Kofi Annan`s visit, as if its greatest hope was for
recognition from the UN secretary-general. After all, the
UN official was there to put into effect a resolution
that is unjust to Lebanon and its resistance movement.
Modesty, action instead of words, persistence,
organization and judgment are the qualities that have
distinguished Hizbullah over the past two decades, giving
the Lebanese resistance its unique character. The party`s
greatest success is in having developed a workable model
for resistance, ending inferiority complexes and
defeatist theories based on the notion that Arabs are
culturally or genetically flawed.
In the wake of the recent victory, even immediately
preceding it, there were some ominous signs. Not only
were there displays of pictures of Iranian leaders,
reminiscent of the Arab communists` displays of socialist
leaders in the past, as if they were new religious icons,
but kitschy portraits of the Hizbullah leader began to
appear on private and public buildings, cars, in
restaurants and stores. Of course there is no comparing
this with the ubiquitous pictures of regime leaders that
Arab governments force on their publics. The
proliferation of Nasrallah images was spontaneous and
reflected genuine popular admiration and widespread
support for the resistance. Nevertheless, one would think
that a party bearing a liberationist message would strive
to minimize this type of personality cult, which has
always been a product of folk faith and official
encouragement. Instead the party is fostering it through
its publications and media.
Generally, political movements tend to condemn this
phenomenon only in others. Arab nationalists condemned
the hero worship of Stalin yet these same people turned
Gamal Abdel-Nasser into an icon in a similar way. The
revolutionary left, which scoffed at both Stalinists and
Nasserists, pinned up its pictures of Marx and Che
Guevara. The problem with this is that it obviates
critical thought because it voids the symbols of the
ideas they are meant to embody. To personify an idea by
vesting symbolic meaning in an individual is to elevate
that individual beyond criticism. This immunity must
inevitably alter the quality of the idea itself.
No one in the West would know the daughter of Guevara.
Yet she was received in Lebanon as if she was the member
of a royal dynasty in line for succession. That`s how
things work in Lebanon. Religious affiliations are an
important part of politics and social life, but
ultimately everything boils down to powerful family
dynasties. Hizbullah has stood as a remarkable exception.
Its leaders fought with their own sons on the field of
battle and paid the price instead of sending other
people`s sons off to war as they groomed their own to
take over. This policy has won Hizbullah respect among
Lebanese and Arab forces. It would be a pity if this
model was now sullied by personality cults.
Democracy is not a panacea that will solve all our
problems. The history of democracy is full of attempts to
falsify the popular will, to delude the people, to
purchase power, to use sensationalism and mass media
chicanery to turn opinion in a particular direction. Yet
whatever its failings, it is difficult to imagine such
leader worship in a democracy, regardless of how popular
a leader is. Democracy, democratic institutions and the
rule of law are inherently averse to the adulation of
political leaders. Democratic societies seem to have
channeled the inclination to hero worship into the
alternative `religions` of mass consumer societies, which
take as their temples the stage and screen and sporting
arenas. The daily brass tacks of politics keep
politicians far too busy to become media celebrities,
apart from at campaign time. In the Arab world, by
contrast, the cult of the ruler is usually pursued in
inverse proportion to his political legitimacy.
Hizbullah is not the ruling party, though you would never
guess given the adoration accorded to its leaders. But
even if it were just a resistance movement such
personality cultism is inconsistent with its function. I
know that a large portion of the resistance`s leadership
would agree with me on this point, though they would hold
that the cult comes with the territory, is a product of a
process of mobilization that draws on both political and
religious sentiments. They would add that it is a healthy
expression of self-respect to brandish pictures of
resistance leaders in the faces of the dynastic heads of
the various religious denominations who do not have to
lift a finger to have their pictures posted around the
country while simultaneously ridiculing the ubiquitous
pictures of rulers in neighboring countries. All this is
true, but the party is still responsible for the type of
culture it is disseminating.
What are we to make, for example, of such post- war
declarations as `my children died as martyrs in the cause
of Al-Sayid,` or `this house was destroyed by the Israeli
bombardment, but to those concerned the house was offered
as tribute to Al-Sayid`. Obviously these are expressions
of sacrifice for the sake of the resistance or the
national cause. They are meant to affirm the
determination to remain steadfast and to challenge anyone
who tries to drive a wedge between the resistance and the
families that lost their homes or loved ones. That is the
political message of such declarations. But it is one
thing for people to say such things in private and quite
another for Hizbullah to broadcast them through its
media. The latter represents a conscious attempt to shape
a culture favorable to the party. Such a culture may be
useful when directed against foreign invaders but it
cannot combat social and economic backwardness, political
regression, corruption, exploitation, sectarianism and
nepotism.
Some presume that the culture of the resistance offers an
alternative to the general spectacle of an Arab world
that has succumbed to all of the above. The phenomena I
have described though, suggests the opposite. This is not
because of its sectarian character, which is unavoidable
given conditions in Lebanon. In fact, Hizbullah deserves
credit for its openness to other political/sectarian
forces and the model of religious tolerance it has
presented. However, it has not presented Lebanon with a
non- sectarian model. Even if Hizbullah`s origins are a
natural product of the Lebanese environment we could hope
it might offer an alternative. The party has every right
to boast of offering a model of dedication and
organization at the level of the resistance, but it has
not offered an alternative vision for society. The
resistance culture Hizbullah is fostering is a culture
determined to reject foreign hegemony and adopt modern
and rational means to organize and equip the party and
its social bases towards that end. This is precisely why
it is difficult to imagine a resistance leader squirming
before a foreign journalist asking him whether he is
going to recognize Israel. But this culture does not
offer an alternative to the Arab world`s prevalent
political culture. Perhaps this is not Hizbullah`s
historic mission. Perhaps it should not be asked to
perform this mission. But an alternative to the
prevailing political and social culture is urgently
needed throughout the Arab world. Imitating Hizbullah is
not the answer, because the nature of the mission is not
the same.
* Member of the Israeli Knesset from Nazareth. He is
heading the National Democratic Coalition `Balad`.
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