THE HANDSTAND | SEPTEMBER 2005 |
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ISRAEL Everything is a synthetic realism. Everything belongs to safety orange. It is a gaseous color: fluid, invisible, capable
of moving out of those legislated topographies that have
been traditionally fenced off from nature to provide
significant nuances for daily living. Perhaps it is a
perfume: an optical Chanel No. 5 for the turn of the
millennium, imbuing our bodies with its diffuse form.
(Chanel was the first abstract perfume, as it was
completely chemical and not based on any flower;
appropriately, it arrived on the scene at roughly the
same time as Cubism.) The blind aura of safety orange has
entered everyday living space. One pure distillation
appears in the logo for Home Depot, which posits one's
most intimate sphere, the household, as a site that is
under perpetual construction, re-organization, and
improvement. The home becomes unnatural, industrial,
singed with toxic energy. Microsoft also uses the color
for its lettering, conjuring its associative power to
suggest that a scientific future is always here around
us, but may be fruitfully harnessed (Your home computer
is a nuclear reactor).FROM
cOLOURS/sAFETY oRANGE, tIM gRIFFIN, Cabinet Magazine, www.cabinetmagazine.org
This record mentions Yossi Beilin who
turns up again today in matters concerning the Gaza
Strip:
h kREISLER
iNTERVIEWS yOSSI bEILIN : eXCERPTS The peace process really took off at the beginning of the last decade with the Oslo Accords. Why did they fail? They failed mainly because it was such a challenge for the extremists on both sides. They had the upper hand. They took it very seriously. They fought against the process as much as they could, while the moderate people were just happy. They did not fight. They did not demonstrate. They were happy that their governments took such bold decisions, and didn't feel that they had the need to fight for their own governments, which already had taken the decisions. This was a grave mistake of the coalition of sanity in the Middle East, which gave into the coalition of insanity. We are all now paying the price for this victory, which I hope is a very provisional one. The people on both sides who didn't want a solution undertook actions that increased the probability that there would not be a solution.... Actually, the idea of Ehud Barak as the Labour prime minister was to have on board the rightist parties, including the Religious National Party, until the crossroads, which would be conducive to a permanent solution. The idea was a very interesting one: to have a broad coalition, to get together to the point of a decision, and then to have a referendum when you don't need your political coalition [anymore], but your constituency. And if you win that referendum, then you can implement the permanent agreement....... You're a political scientist. Some critics say that all of this won't be fixed until Israel changes its political system, so that the governing coalitions are not as dependent on minority parties, some of whom are a very supportive of the settlements. I'm not sure that by technical decision you will change the ideology. Even if the political system imposes a reshuffle, you may have bigger parties, but they themselves would be coalitions. Then the leadership will have to be attentive to the internal coalition, as it is now attentive to the external coalition. So I am not one of those who believe that the systems are changing everything. Of course, they have ramifications, they have an impact on ideology. But the ideology is there, and what we have to tackle is the substance of the matter, not only the style. Is there a contradiction at the core of Zionism? On the one hand, secular, committed to Western values, to democracy; but on the other hand, a component that is faced toward the religion and emphasizes the Jewish people's connection to the land as it is written in the Bible. I don't think that Zionism as a movement, which was
created in the nineteenth century, is connected to
religion. But under the Zionist umbrella there are
different movements, and one of them is a religious one.
The other one is secular, and there are liberals, and
there are socialists, and all of them under one umbrella.
The umbrella is saying something which is very simple:
that the Jewish people, like many other peoples, like all
the other peoples, deserve the right to
self-determination and a state, as long as it doesn't
take the rights of the others. This is the original idea.
The idea is that there will be one state in the world
whereby there will be a Jewish majority. A Jewish
majority will enable the state to absorb any Jew who is
asking for a rescue. This is the original idea. It is very, very difficult to compare, because one may
criticize the settlements as one wishes, and you will not
find somebody who would criticize the settlements more
than myself -- I think that even building one brick on
the West Bank in Gaza since '67 was a huge mistake -- but
to compare this project with suicide bombing, with
killing of innocent people, is very problematic. It is
true that on both sides, we cannot understand the two
phenomena, which doesn't mean that they are the same. Talk now a little about the informal processes that start the peace process again. I know that in the making of Oslo, you were a key figure. You were one of the first people talking to Palestinians on the other side. And, again, we see that phenomenon, that we were at a standstill in the peace process, and in the last couple of months, Israelis on one side and Palestinians on the other began talking informally. Tell us a little about the dynamic of that process. What leads you to each other, so to speak? We never stopped talking to each other. It is not a couple of months, it is three years. Immediately after the end of the Taba negotiations, that was January, 2001, Yasser Abed Rabbo, who was then the Minister of Culture and Information, and myself, the Minister of Justice, talked about the situation. Our belief was that had we had more time and better circumstances, we could have concluded the job and had an agreement. We decided, after the defeat of Prime Minister Barak to the new Prime Minister Sharon, that we would dedicate our efforts in order to try, on a private basis, to conclude the job, first and foremost to prove to ourselves that a solution is possible. Since then, we have worked at the beginning in a very modest way with a few people. Then we enlarged the coalitions on each side. We hired experts; we prepared maps. It was a kind of a simulation. We decided to do two things: first of all, to get to the details. Our belief is that God is in the details; not the devil. Because people don't believe that it is possible to have a detailed agreement anymore, that there is a solution for the refugee problem, that there is a solution for the Jerusalem problem. If you prove that there is such a solution, they might change their minds. I'm speaking about the peace camps, about the skeptical people, not necessarily about the extreme doves and the hawks, and the extreme right on both sides. The second thing was to sign a commitment, because in
the past, no signatures were taken and were given. The
feeling that you are signing and you are giving something
of yourself, you dedicate something, you are giving up on
something but you get more, was very important for us. So
we signed on a cover letter, not on the agreement itself,
because the agreement will be between the government of
Israel and the PLO, and we are not representing them
today. But we signed on a cover letter, which was sent to
the Swiss Foreign Minister, depositing the agreement
itself and committing ourselves to the draft of the
agreement. By that, I believe that we proved to many --
not to those who don't want to believe, but those who
wanted to believe and couldn't anymore -- that there is a
partner, that there is a plan, that if we are courageous
enough and if we are ready to pay the price, here there
is a moment. The governments, at the moment of truth,
will have to decide whether they want to use it as a
basis, whether they want to change it. But there is one
thing that they cannot take from us, that it is feasible. Our secret is that we never invented the wheel. We are continuing a path which began with the Rogers plan in '69. What did Rogers say, the secretary of state, then? That the solution will be between Israel and Palestine, with minor modifications of the '67 borders. This was the idea, this has been the idea all the years. This was the Reagan plan, and then it was the Clinton plan, and the Shultz plan, in a way. Eventually what we did was implemented the last phase of the Oslo process. The Oslo process spoke about five years of an interim solution with the Palestinian Authority conducive to a permanent solution at the end of the period. The end of the period was May 4, 1999. We never had an agreement then. The second date was extended to September 13, 2000; even then there was no agreement. Now, there is no new date. What we are saying is, "Here is, actually, the permanent solution that we needed." It is the continuation of Taba. It is based on the ideas of Clinton, which were the most developed ideas and the most detailed ideas ever suggested to both parties. And this is also the third part of the road map. The road map is the legitimate son of the Bush vision from June 24, 2002. The road map was offered to the parties at the beginning of 2003. The road map speaks about three steps: the first is confidence-building measures, the second is a Palestinian state with provisional borders, and the third is a permanent solution, which will deal with refugees and security in Jerusalem and all these things. This should be implemented by 2005, which means almost yesterday. So we are coming with a third phase. We are not contradicting, of course, the first phases. But that should be a model for the third phase. If one is serious about implementation of the road
map, one has to be prepared with a permanent solution
already, or at least talk about it. Now, nothing is
taking place, nothing is going on about the permanent
solution. This why I believe that what we are doing may
revive the road map, which has weakened in the last
months. I believe that they don't have an answer. I believe
that they don't have an alternative to what we suggest,
because there are actually only two options, in my view.
One is to have an agreed upon border as part of a general
agreement, and another is to withdraw unilaterally, and
to decide upon our own border. If you don't do either a
unilateral or an agreement, you are left with an
abyss.....................I believe that the public
opinion in Israel is our biggest asset. This was the
public opinion which convinced the government of Israel
to withdraw from Lebanon. This was the public opinion
which supported the Oslo agreement. And this was the
public opinion which was ready to support an agreement
after the King David summit in July 2000, had this summit
concluded successfully. Yes. I agree with you one hundred percent. The original idea of a fence came from the left, many people from the left who said, "If you don't have an agreement, if you don't trust the partner, okay, let us withdraw unilaterally." Eventually, the fence now is dividing between Israelis, the settlers who live on the West Bank and the Israelis who went to the west side of it. What are we going to do? Are we going to the fence only part of our citizens against the others? The wall became something which is very bizarre. It is neither hawkish nor dovish. It is very, very expensive. And I don't believe that it is going to give us a safe haven. I'm not a pacifist. I understand that even if we have
a peace agreement, it doesn't mean that we will have a
quiet situation by a hundred percent. But I do believe
that if we have peace, which will be perceived by both
sides as a first solution, then the level of violence
will drop drastically. Such a wall may just endanger us
more, and irritate the other side, and create for them a
vision of people who want to take their land and things
like this. It is contrary to the original idea of
building the wall and saying, "This is our state,
this is our border; we are waiting for a better partner
to appear, and until then, we will live as good neighbors
or bad neighbors with the fence between us." [Today]
this is not the case. You [recently] used the term, "Two peoples, two narratives." It seems that behind your thinking is the idea that somehow there has to be a settlement that takes account of the two narratives, reconciles the people to each other to accepting both sides of the stories, in some way. Is that a fair statement of your view and what this peace process might ultimately result in? I would say the following: the Geneva Accord doesn't refer to the narratives at all. We don't have the two narratives. We don't have a united narrative. We have just a solution. From that point of view, it is very logical and rational. It doesn't mean that we don't take into account the importance of the narratives, and it doesn't mean that we believe that it is easy to make from these two different narratives, one. But there is one thing which is, I believe, important: that people will know exactly what is the narrative of the other side. I'm sure that it might make them angry, irritate them, and assure them that the other side is lying, is telling the wrong story, or whatever, but it is important to understand. Some things which seem to you obvious and logical, seem to me almost crazy; but if I know it, at least I can take it into account. And if I don't want to irritate you, I will behave. I will say to myself, "Well, there's something wrong with you, but at least it is not my target to make you angry and to fight with you. I know that you have this story and this is what you believe. I know that my story is very different. Let's coexist." It must take a lot of hope in your line of work, as somebody who's been so instrumental, so important in trying to make the peace process possible, and to revive it when it fails. Talk a little about that. How have you maintained that hope in an ultimate solution? It won't surprise you that I have a positive view about myself. But I don't think that I should be the one to talk about it. For me, to be optimistic is actually my raison d'etre. I don't think that any political leader can lead if he or she is pessimistic. Just to have a gloomy vision about the future will not lead us anywhere. So I believe that it comes with the job. If you are a political leader, you must give hope to the people, and you must believe in it. You cannot deceive them. I believe that we can have a better world. I believe
that it is in our hands. We made many mistakes, but we
should not give up on it. The fact that we failed once in
the game doesn't mean that we don't have peace with
Egypt, that we don't have peace with Jordan, that we
cannot go to the Arab world, that I cannot go to Morocco
next week. It is a different world than the one to which
I was born. It is a better world in many aspects. It is a
worse world in other aspects. The duty of people like
myself is to emphasize the better part of it and to try
and lead my people towards peace with the Palestinians,
which is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If we
solve this heart of the conflict, I think that we can
change the status of Israel in the world, and in the Arab
world. This is, in my view, the sense of Zionism. If you had to address a group of students and explain to them what you've learned as a person and as a political leader in this odyssey that you've been on to find a solution, what would you tell them? I would tell them that when they think
that something is a very solid floor, it might be a very
thin layer of ice. That one should go on his or her toes.
Because what we are doing is something which is very
difficult. It is against nature. It is so easy to hate,
and to punish each other, and to retaliate, and it is so
difficult to understand the other and to have a
reconciliation, that even if it seems as if it happened,
it's still in the making. If this is the case, take it
very seriously and understand that it is not necessarily
a solid flow. |