MARCH 2004
http://www.templebuilders.com/maps/israelhtm.htm
A swift glance at the map above provokes some questions: Arab territories are labelled in Red, Israeli putative territories in Black. It appears that Palestinians may only look forward to settling in Gaza.....
Gaza Armed Groups, The Resistance Achilles' heel
By Ghassan Andoniİ-IMEMC-Analysis, February 12, 2004
It is quite puzzling to understand why the army launched the Wednesday raids in northern Gaza city and Rafah in the Gaza strip. Even when the army described the operation as targeting resistance activists who "solified their abilities and escalated assults, mainly of Qassam rocket attacks against Sderot", Haaretz daily news paper analyst Ze'ev Schiff could not but notice, in his Thursday analysis, that the last Qassam rocket fired from Northern Gaza was on February 6.
Schiff believes that the army, this time, "did not have a specific objective, but was merely attempting to make combative contact with Hamas gunmen". According to Schiff, even the killing of Hanni Abu Sukheileh, a Hamas major operative, was reported by the army as fortuitous. With lack of army claims for a "ticking Bomb" situation or an obvious target for the raid, it is very likely that the raid, which was approved two days before, had political objectives. Schiff listed two possible objectives; one to prove to Palestinians that withdrwal from Gaza is not victory for resistance, second to prevent Hamas from gaining control of Gaza after the withdrawal. One needs to carefully examine the possible goal of paving the way for a retreat from the earlier proposed evacuation plan through escalating the conflcits to levels that can justify it.
Faced with more domestic hardships than expected and with a hesitant support from the side of the United States Administration, Sharon, who hoped to be rewarded with expanding West bank settlements in exchange to evacuating the Gaza ones, is more worried about the Genie he unleished.
The operation started with army special units infiltrating into the north part of the Gaza city to stimulate a clash with resistance gunmen. Further on, local resistance men, with their modest machineguns, stood no chance in a day-light clash with soldiers equipped with the world's best military technology.
In practical terms, Schiff believes that the aim of the operation was to kill as many of resistance operatives; an objective closely tied with other aims almost in all army conducts inside the Palestinian territories.
As the Palestinian Authority is incapable of defending its "area's", especially in Gaza, local gunmen from different resistance factions and locally initiated groups took the painful rule of defending the symbols of "limited sovereignty" and confronting army whenever soldiers attempt to break in.
The strength of resistance group is inherited in their high motive, mobility, and secretiveness. Yet, semi public armed groups, a phenomenon that ended in the West Bank after the "Pre-emptive Shield" operation, are still the ones who dominate the scene in the populated parts of the Gaza strip.Except for moral raising and the affirmation of the power structure inside the different Gaza Cities, towns, and refugee camps, such groups are totally ineffective as "defenders of sovereignty". The hundreds of armed young people become an easy and legitimate target for army to crackdown the moral of resistance through repeated simulated clashes in which army can overpower them and
cause high death tolls.
One could possibly conclude that revenge attacks that targets a high death toll inside Israel stems out of the need for a dramatic scene to raise the moral among the same armed young men; a painful cycle that seems endless.
Evidently, it is not those semi-public armed groups that are the main concern of the security establishment in Israel. Beside their domestic role in keeping a certain level of power balance that allows for resistance to function side by side with the Palestinian Authority, they represent very little harm to Israeli security. It is the hard core of highly motivated underground groups that presents the main threat, and enjoys an advantage over army and security men. They can initiate attacks and hide within the public. Such groups equally exist in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and are the ones who causes a similar pain to the one that the army causes as it invades Palestinian populated areas.
Surprisingly enough, resistance groups still see a value in preserving semi-public armed groups; their Achilles' heel, and at the same time the army keeps operating against the ones who present the least possible threat. It might be to the interest of resistance to dismantle its semi-public armed groups that are so far serving as an easy and legitimate target to the army in the deadly game in which each is attempting to demoralize the other side. Strangely enough, lack of disarming was the main excuse presented by Israel to avoid being a partner to all suggested cease-fire agreement.
www.imemc.org/headlines/2004/February/week2/021204/gaza%
FROM HA'ARETZ WE READ:
Mofaz intends to leave troops in Gaza after withdrawal
By Gideon Alon and Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondents and agencies
"The defense establishment is considering holding onto Gush Katif after the evacuation of the settlers as a "bargaining chip" in future negotiations with the Palestinians."
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz supports the evacuation of the settlers in Gush Katif and the isolated pockets in one fell swoop a year from now. But he is considering leaving troops in some parts of Gush Katif to keep control over the area. He thinks the government should speak with the settlement residents about alternative sites to replant their communities, in Pithat Shalom, for example, or somewhere else in the Negev. With chances nil that Israeli settlements will remain in Gaza, Israel can redeploy to a more convenient security reality and continue fighting terror. In the absence of Israeli civilians in the area, the Israel Defense Forces would enjoy more freedom of movement, and if necessary, the army would enter Palestinian Gaza, as it does now.
Israel will have to make clear to Hamas and Islamic Jihad that the departure from Gaza is neither an escape nor a retreat and the army won't stop fighting them after the withdrawal the way it stopped fighting Hezbollah after the withdrawal from Lebanon.
Control over the Jordan Valley is also an Israeli interest, and will be part of the permanent agreement, according to Mofaz.
He believes Israel should prepare for an agreement with the Palestinians within five years, in a two-stage process: an interim agreement to be reached in 18 months, followed by the permanent agreement. By then, Israel will have shaped a more convenient reality, both in Gaza and the West Bank, where the fence will continue going up.
U.S. officials said Tuesday that they are worried that unilateral Israeli moves to relocate settlers from the Gaza Strip will boost the standing of Palestinian extremists amid concerns about a growing "anarchy" on Palestinian streets.The radical Hamas group could be expected to claim credit for the Israeli withdrawal and may become the "dominant" force in Gaza by undercutting an already weakened Palestinian Authority.
But, he added: "Does Hamas get credit and basically become the really dominant authority in Gaza or is the Palestinian Authority able to deliver services in such a way, and is the international community able to support the delivery of services in such a way, that Hamas doesn't become the big guy on the block?"
"Somebody is going to have to help the Palestinian Authority. They don't have the resources" to compete with Hamas," another official said.
Artist:Die Brücke, c/o Ahmad Kamal Telefon 01 831 32 11
Erasing the 'optics' of Gaza
"If Sharon successfully removes a majority of settlers from Gaza (relocating them to the West Bank or the Negev), which he himself states will take one or two years, he will, no doubt, be praised by the US and Europeans for having made "painful concessions" for peace for which Palestinians will have to reciprocate. Israel will be financially rewarded and Sharon, having "relinquished" volatile Gaza, will have strengthened his argument for maintaining control over those West Bank areas deemed essential for security or settlement purposes."
"Most importantly, Israeli mothers and fathers do not want their children sent to Khan Younis or Netzarim to perform military service, where they face considerable danger."
OpinionDS 14/02/04 / The Daily Star
From the time I started researching the Gaza Strip almost two decades ago, I have encountered two recurring themes in Palestinian-Israeli relations: Israel's desire to rid itself of any responsibility for Gaza, while maintaining control over it; and its desire to "exchange" Gaza for full and internationally (read "American") sanctioned Israeli control of the West Bank. (Please be kind enough to look at the map heading again re. this article.jb,editor)
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent proposal to evacuate 17 of the 20 settlements in Gaza but leaving Israel with direct control over all of Gaza's borders, its air space and waters, and the settlement of Gush Katif is simply the latest expression of longstanding Israeli policy that will keep Gaza an imprisoned canton. Sharon's proposal, which is one part of his unilateral separation plan, would effectively complete implementation of Oslo's 1994 "Gaza and Jericho-First" plan, which similarly aimed to create a provisional Palestinian state in Gaza, allowing Israel to pursue, in one form or another, the de facto annexation of the West Bank, which it very successfully did during the seven years of the "peace" process.
In fact it was the physical changes to the West Bank imposed by Oslo, notably its division into areas A, B and C, that are now facilitating Sharon's usurpation of Palestinian lands and their incorporation into Israel.
The Gaza disengagement plan, while a reversal of Sharon's policies, should be understood as part of the same political continuum created by the Oslo process (and indeed by Israeli policies since 1967, beginning with the Allon Plan). It should also be understood as serving the same goals: to maintain full Israeli control direct and indirect over all Palestinian lands and resources; consolidate and institutionalize direct and permanent military and political control over a majority of the West Bank (primarily through continued settlement expansion, the concentration of settlers in main settlement blocs, control over the Jordan Valley and the building of the separation barrier); secure, to the extent possible, demographic separation with the Palestinians, and thereby guarantee a Jewish majority within Israel (which may now include transferring some Arab-Israeli citizens to a future Palestinian state); and ensure that if a Palestinian state is declared, it will be weak, diminished and highly dependent on Israel a condition Sharon believes the Palestinians will have no choice but to accept. In this way, Sharon is seeking to manage rather than end the conflict, in a manner acceptable internationally and domestically.
If Sharon successfully removes a majority of settlers from Gaza (relocating them to the West Bank or the Negev), which he himself states will take one or two years, he will, no doubt, be praised by the US and Europeans for having made "painful concessions" for peace for which Palestinians will have to reciprocate. Israel will be financially rewarded and Sharon, having "relinquished" volatile Gaza, will have strengthened his argument for maintaining control over those West Bank areas deemed essential for security or settlement purposes. Some observers argue that under such a scenario, Israeli control could extend to almost 60 percent of the West Bank, leaving Palestinians under permanent and worsening occupation.
Domestically, Sharon's call to disengage from Gaza holds great appeal to many if not most Israelis, including the military, which does not support its occupation or the expense associated with it. Most importantly, Israeli mothers and fathers do not want their children sent to Khan Younis or Netzarim to perform military service, where they face considerable danger. Furthermore, as a US official recently told me: "The optics of Rafah are appalling to many here and abroad," and erasing them from popular consciousness has its own advantages.
For Palestinians these "optics" include: the division of the West Bank into 300 isolated clusters, and Gaza into four; the building of more than 500 military checkpoints throughout the West Bank and Gaza since the start of the uprising, solidifying the fragmentation and isolation of Palestinian lands and severely restricting the movement of people; the demolition of at least 3,000 homes since September 2000, leaving between 10,000 and 40,000 people homeless in Gaza alone while the number of settlers in Gaza's Kfar Darom and Netzarim settlements grew by 51 percent and 24 percent, respectively, since March 2001 when Sharon came to power.
In parallel, there has been a contraction of the Palestinian economy by half; an average unemployment rate of between 30-40 percent over the last three years, with rates in Gaza exceeding 50 percent at times; a poverty rate that increased from 21 percent in September 2000 to 60 percent as early as December 2002, with certain regions of Gaza reaching 80 percent; a decline in overall food consumption of more than 25 percent per capita, with more than half the Palestinian population totally dependent on food aid, and over 22 percent of Palestinian children suffering from acute and severe malnutrition levels equivalent to those in parts of sub-Saharan Africa; the destruction of, and damage to, Palestine's physical resources, amounting to a loss of $1.7 billion through 2002; and the building of the separation barrier in the West Bank, now projected to run over 600 kilometers, cutting the territory into 16 isolated communities, effectively annexing at least 15 percent and as much as 58 percent of the West Bank to Israel, and entrapping or otherwise severely affecting over 670,000 Palestinians through loss of land and destruction of assets.
In light of these realities, any attempt by Israel to unilaterally separate from Palestinians will bring further misery and certain disaster. Yet, such attempts have already been implemented long before Sharon's disengagement proposal. In May 2003, for example, foreign visitors wishing to enter Gaza, including human rights and NGO workers and international monitors, were required to sign a waiver absolving Israel of responsibility for their injury or death by the Israeli Army. Many refused and consequently fewer are present in Gaza.
On Jan. 4, 2004 Israel issued a new set of restrictions designed to obstruct the entry of foreign nationals into Gaza and the West Bank, further isolating Palestinians. Now, individuals wishing to enter the Occupied Territories must apply for permission and obtain written authorization from the Israeli civil administration. Permission to enter Gaza requires a minimum of five days to obtain. Individuals found in the West Bank or Gaza without official authorization can be deported and refused future entry into Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Perhaps most worrisome, NGOs wishing to enter Gaza must now disclose the following information to the Israelis which many are loathe to do before permission will be given: information about the organization, its annual report, website and scope of work; a 24-hour contact number and the CV of the head of mission; information about the main funders of the organization; a letter from the home consulate or embassy of the organization stating it is recognized as an aid or development organization; and a list of expatriate staff wishing to enter Gaza, including names, passport numbers, nationality and position. This information must be supplied five working days in advance of entry.
The requirements will increase the difficulties already encountered by NGOs operating in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, the provision of humanitarian relief has become so encumbered that the heads of several international and UN agencies have threatened to cease their operations altogether.
Unilateral separation, which in the end is physically and functionally impossible, has yet to succeed as a long-term policy. Sharon's strategy "giving up" some land to gain control over other land is an old one among Israeli politicians. What is different now is the rapidly deteriorating conditions of life among Palestinians, and the slow but steady dissipation of their society. There is no separation from that.
Sara Roy is a senior research scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR
Artist Joe Sacco
Copyrightİ 1997-2004 The Daily Star (ISSN 1564-0310).
From ASKawar
The IDF's shooting range By Gideon Levy
Sun., February 15, 2004
http://www.haaretz.com
It sometimes seems the Gaza Strip has become the central shooting range of the Israel Defense Forces, the IDF's firing zone and training field. The weapons in use there are of dubious legality, the rules of engagement lack the element of restraint, and punitive measures that Israel would not conceive of inflicting in the West Bank are par for the course, in a region that produces far less terrorism than the West Bank.
The operation last Wednesday, in the Sajiyeh quarter of Gaza City, in which 15 Palestinians were killed - including at least seven civilians - was the latest illustration, for the time being, of what Israel allows itself to do in Gaza. Fifteen dead for the sake of liquidating one Hamas man who wasn't very senior in the organization is an intolerable price. In Gaza, though, it has become routine: Once every week or two, the IDF moves in, kills, demolishes and pulls out, and no one knows exactly what it was all in aid of. Why do wanted individuals have to be liquidated now in Gaza altogether? Is it only to bring about more revenge terrorism?
The fact that not one terrorist attack against Israel has originated from the Gaza Strip, because of the fence there, only heightens these questions. One begins to suspect that the IDF is behaving like this in Gaza simply because it can do whatever it fancies there.
The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have always been differentiated in the Israeli consciousness. Whereas Ramallah and Bethlehem are considered cities inhabited by people, Gaza has always been portrayed as a "nest of terrorists." The fact that nearly 1.5 million people live there, among them farmers and intellectuals, merchants and craftsmen, religious and secular people - just like anywhere else - has been deliberately distorted here. Try to tell an Israeli that the beaches of the Gaza Strip are among the most beautiful in the Middle East and that the majority of the Gazans are cordial, especially warm people. Who will believe that? The demonization to which Gaza has been subjected, going back to the period before the occupation, has made it possible to behave differently there. Just as in the Israeli-occupied areas of Lebanon, which were remote and where almost everything was allowed, the occupation of Gaza, too, has always been marked by a sense of anarchy, dating back to the operations carried out there by Ariel Sharon and Meir Dagan (the current head of the Mossad) in the 1970s.
According to the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, there were five liquidations in the Gaza Strip in the past four months, as compared with only one in the West Bank. Why this ratio? Is it because the Gazans are more dangerous, or because more is allowed in Gaza?
The streets of Rafah resemble the set of a violent war movie. It's the Grozny of Gaza. To date, Israel has demolished hundreds of homes, including 40 in one day two weeks ago. The declared pretext - the arms-smuggling tunnels from Sinai - can't justify destruction on this scale. The IDF would never dare carry out demolitions of this scope in the West Bank. Suffice it to recall how Jenin became a worldwide symbol two years ago, in Operation Defensive Shield. In Rafah the suffering is greater than in Jenin, but no one takes an interest. There are hardly any foreign correspondents there, and of course no Israeli journalists. It's not by chance that peace activists Rachel Corrie and Tom Hurndall and the cameraman James Miller were killed there.
It's there that Israel renews its arsenal, too. The miniature black steel darts that scattered in every direction in September 2002, in the vineyard of the Hagin family, killing a mother, two sons and their cousin who were picking grapes, were semi-flechette shells - an illegal antipersonnel weapon generally fired from tanks. At least twice the IDF used the destructive shell, whose scattered darts I saw stuck in the sides of buildings a great distance from the place where the family members were killed. The IDF has not dared to use flechette shells in the West Bank. Similarly, the bombing of population centers from the air has been authorized on a number of occasions in Gaza. The air force, even under the command of the unrestrained Major General Dan Halutz, would not have the temerity to drop a half-ton bomb on a crowded residential area in Ramallah. But it's okay in Gaza, as in the liquidation of Hamas activist Saleh Shehadeh in July 2002 with a one-ton bomb.
The rules of engagement are different in Gaza, too. In November 2001 the deputy military judge advocate general admitted that there is a "vast difference" in the guidelines for opening fire between Central Command (the West Bank) and Southern Command (the Gaza Strip). Why should this be so? In the area of the isolated Gaza Strip settlement of Netzarim and along the fence around the Gaza Strip, the order is to shoot anything that moves, with no prior warning. The latest victims were a group of children who approached the fence in the A-Salem neighborhood of Rafah on the
weekend. A 10-year-old boy was killed and three of his friends were wounded because the soldiers saw them as "suspicious figures."
Testimony of the "anything goes" atmosphere was given by a senior IDF officer back in 1998, during a tour of the Gaza Strip by representatives of human rights organizations. Asked whether Gaza Strip terrorists were more dangerous, he replied, "No, but here we can do more."
Gideon LevyİFeb.2004
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