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Iranian
Elections: The Stolen Elections Hoax James
Petras Change
for the poor means food and jobs, not a relaxed dress
code or mixed recreation
Politics in Iran is a lot
more about class war than religion. Financial
Times Editorial, June 15 2009 Introduction There is hardly any election, in which the White House
has a significant stake, where the electoral defeat of
the pro-US candidate is not denounced as illegitimate by
the entire political and mass media elite. In the most
recent period, the White House and its camp followers
cried foul following the free (and monitored) elections
in Venezuela and Gaza, while joyously fabricating an
electoral success in Lebanon despite the fact
that the Hezbollah-led coalition received over 53% of the
vote. The recently concluded, June 12, 2009 elections in
Iran are a classic case: The incumbent nationalist- The Electoral Fraud Hoax Western leaders rejected the results because they knew
that their reformist candidate could not lose
For
months they published daily interviews, editorials and
reports from the field detailing the
failures of Ahmadinejads administration; they cited
the support from clerics, former officials, merchants in
the bazaar and above all women and young urbanites fluent
in English, to prove that Mousavi was headed for a
landslide victory. A victory for Mousavi was described as
a victory for the voices of moderation, at
least the White Houses version of that vacuous
cliché. Prominent liberal academics deduced the vote
count was fraudulent because the opposition candidate,
Mousavi, lost in his own ethnic enclave among the Azeris.
Other academics claimed that the youth vote
based on their interviews with upper and middle-class
university students from the neighborhoods of Northern
Tehran were overwhelmingly for the reformist
candidate. What is astonishing about the Wests universal
condemnation of the electoral outcome as fraudulent is
that not a single shred of evidence in either written or
observational form has been presented either before or a
week after the vote count. During the entire electoral
campaign, no credible (or even dubious) charge of voter
tampering was raised. As long as the Western media
believed their own propaganda of an immanent victory for
their candidate, the electoral process was described as
highly competitive, with heated public debates and
unprecedented levels of public activity and unhindered by
public proselytizing. The belief in a free and open
election was so strong that the Western leaders and mass
media believed that their favored candidate would win. The Western media relied on its reporters covering the
mass demonstrations of opposition supporters, ignoring
and downplaying the huge turnout for Ahmadinejad. Worse
still, the Western media ignored the class composition of
the competing demonstrations the fact that the
incumbent candidate was drawing his support from the far
more numerous poor working class, peasant, artisan and
public employee sectors while the bulk of the opposition
demonstrators was drawn from the upper and middle class
students, business and professional class. Moreover, most Western opinion leaders and reporters
based in Tehran extrapolated their projections from their
observations in the capital few venture into the
provinces, small and medium size cities and villages
where Ahmadinejad has his mass base of support. Moreover
the oppositions supporters were an activist
minority of students easily mobilized for street
activities, while Ahmadinejads support drew on the
majority of working youth and household women workers who
would express their views at the ballot box and had
little time or inclination to engage in street politics. A number of newspaper pundits, including Gideon
Rachman of the Financial Times, claim as evidence
of electoral fraud the fact that Ahmadinejad won 63% of
the vote in an Azeri-speaking province against his
opponent, Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri. The simplistic
assumption is that ethnic identity or belonging to a
linguistic group is the only possible explanation of
voting behavior rather than other social or class
interests. A closer look at the voting pattern in the
East-Azerbaijan region of Iran reveals that Mousavi won
only in the city of Shabestar among the upper and the
middle classes (and only by a small margin), whereas he
was soundly defeated in the larger rural areas, where the
re-distributive policies of the Ahmadinejad government
had helped the ethnic Azeris write off debt, obtain cheap
credits and easy loans for the farmers. Mousavi did win
in the West-Azerbaijan region, using his ethnic ties to
win over the urban voters. In the highly populated Tehran
province, Mousavi beat Ahmadinejad in the urban centers
of Tehran and Shemiranat by gaining the vote of the
middle and upper class districts, whereas he lost badly
in the adjoining working class suburbs, small towns and
rural areas. The careless and distorted emphasis on ethnic
voting cited by writers from the Financial Times
and New York Times to justify calling Ahmadinejad
s victory a stolen vote is matched by
the medias willful and deliberate refusal to
acknowledge a rigorous nationwide public opinion poll
conducted by two US experts just three weeks before the
vote, which showed Ahmadinejad leading by a more than 2
to 1 margin even larger than his electoral victory
on June 12. This poll revealed that among ethnic Azeris,
Ahmadinejad was favored by a 2 to 1 margin over Mousavi,
demonstrating how class interests represented by one
candidate can overcome the ethnic identity of the other
candidate (Washington Post June 15, 2009). The
poll also demonstrated how class issues, within age
groups, were more influential in shaping political
preferences than generational life style.
According to this poll, over two-thirds of Iranian youth
were too poor to have access to a computer and the 18-24
year olds comprised the strongest voting bloc
for Ahmadinejad of all groups (Washington
Porst June 15, 2009). The only group, which
consistently favored Mousavi, was the university students
and graduates, business owners and the upper middle class.
The youth vote, which the Western media
praised as pro-reformist, was a clear
minority of less than 30% but came from a highly
privileged, vocal and largely English speaking group with
a monopoly on the Western media. Their overwhelming
presence in the Western news reports created what has
been referred to as the North Tehran Syndrome,
for the comfortable upper class enclave from which many
of these students come. While they may be articulate,
well dressed and fluent in English, they were soundly out-voted
in the secrecy of the ballot box. In general, Ahmadinejad did very well in the oil and
chemical producing provinces. This may have be a
reflection of the oil workers opposition to the
reformist program, which included proposals
to privatize public enterprises. Likewise,
the incumbent did very well along the border provinces
because of his emphasis on strengthening national
security from US and Israeli threats in light of an
escalation of US-sponsored cross-border terrorist attacks
from Pakistan and Israeli-backed incursions from Iraqi
Kurdistan, which have killed scores of Iranian citizens.
Sponsorship and massive funding of the groups behind
these attacks is an official policy of the US from the
Bush Administration, which has not been repudiated by
President Obama; in fact it has escalated in the lead-up
to the elections. What Western commentators and their Iranian protégés
have ignored is the powerful impact which the devastating
US wars and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan had on
Iranian public opinion: Ahmadinejads strong
position on defense matters contrasted with the pro-Western
and weak defense posture of many of the campaign
propagandists of the opposition. The great majority of voters for the incumbent
probably felt that national security interests, the
integrity of the country and the social welfare system,
with all of its faults and excesses, could be better
defended and improved with Ahmadinejad than with upper-class
technocrats supported by Western-oriented privileged
youth who prize individual life styles over community
values and solidarity. The demography of voting reveals a real class
polarization pitting high income, free market oriented,
capitalist individualists against working class, low
income, community based supporters of a moral
economy in which usury and profiteering are limited
by religious precepts. The open attacks by opposition
economists of the government welfare spending, easy
credit and heavy subsidies of basic food staples did
little to ingratiate them with the majority of Iranians
benefiting from those programs. The state was seen as the
protector and benefactor of the poor workers against the
market, which represented wealth, power,
privilege and corruption. The Oppositions attack on
the regimes intransigent foreign policy
and positions alienating the West only
resonated with the liberal university students and import-export
business groups. To many Iranians, the regimes
military buildup was seen as having prevented a US or
Israeli attack. The scale of the oppositions electoral deficit
should tell us is how out of touch it is with its own
peoples vital concerns. It should remind them that
by moving closer to Western opinion, they removed
themselves from the everyday interests of security,
housing, jobs and subsidized food prices that make life
tolerable for those living below the middle class and
outside the privileged gates of Tehran University. Amhadinejads electoral success, seen in
historical comparative perspective should not be a
surprise. In similar electoral contests between
nationalist- The consequences of the electoral victory of
Ahmadinejad are open to debate. The US may conclude that
continuing to back a vocal, but badly defeated, minority
has few prospects for securing concessions on nuclear
enrichment and an abandonment of Irans support for
Hezbollah and Hamas. A realistic approach would be to
open a wide-ranging discussion with Iran, and
acknowledging, as Senator Kerry recently pointed out,
that enriching uranium is not an existential threat to
anyone. This approach would sharply differ from the
approach of American Zionists, embedded in the Obama
regime, who follow Israels lead of pushing for a
preemptive war with Iran and use the specious argument
that no negotiations are possible with an illegitimate
government in Tehran which stole an election. Recent events suggest that political leaders in Europe,
and even some in Washington, do not accept the Zionist-mass
media line of stolen elections. The White
House has not suspended its offer of negotiations with
the newly re-elected government but has focused rather on
the repression of the opposition protesters (and not the
vote count). Likewise, the 27 nation European Union
expressed serious concern about violence and
called for the aspirations of the Iranian people
to be achieved through peaceful means and that freedom of
expression be respected (Financial Times
June 16, 2009 p.4). Except for Sarkozy of France, no EU
leader has questioned the outcome of the voting. The wild card in the aftermath of the elections is the
Israeli response: Netanyahu has signaled to his American
Zionist followers that they should use the hoax of electoral
fraud to exert maximum pressure on the Obama
regime to end all plans to meet with the newly re-elected
Ahmadinejad regime. Paradoxically, US commentators (left, right and center)
who bought into the electoral fraud hoax are
inadvertently providing Netanyahu and his American
followers with the arguments and fabrications: Where they
see religious wars, we see class wars; where they see
electoral fraud, we see imperial destabilization. |