
angry review of Spielberg's 'Munich'The Angry
Arab News Service
Monday, December 26, 2005

Spielberg on Munich:the
humanization of Israeli killers, and the dehumanization
of Palestinian civilians. Or the Celebration of the
Israeli Killing Machine. And who is retaliating against
whom in the Arab-Israeli conflict? THIS is the question.
It reminds me of a line that George Carlinyes, that
Carlinused to use in his comedy routine and went
roughly like this: why do we call
Israeli terrorists commandos, and we call Palestinian
commandos terrorists? That line never got a laugh
the two times I saw him use it with a live audience.
The thrust of the Spielberg movie is simple, fanfare
notwithstanding: Israeli killers are conscientious and
humane people, while Palestinians are always--no matter
what--killers. But a Spielberg movie about current
affairs is like a Thomas Friedmans column
about
Emanuel Kant. What do you expect. But you
know? Did you notice how one lone critical opinion of the
movie by one Israeli diplomat, which only mildly
criticized the movie, got so much press in the US? It was
needed; and it even helped to promote the movie to give a
balanced cast to the narrative, that it of
course does not deserve.
This one critical opinion reminded me of OReilly;
how he every night finds one email from somebody in Montana
who tells him that he is too liberal. He needs to that to
maintain an image that does not exist, just as Spielberg
needs to maintain an image that he does not deserve. This
movie could easily have been a paid Israeli advertisement
for its killing machine. In fact, it could be a
recruitment movie for Israeli killing squads. I mean
that. In fact, it is a celebretary movie of Israeli
murder of Palestinians.
Israel killing is always moral, and always careful, and
always on target.
Today, yet another New York Times reviewer who also
thinks that Spielberg was not sympathetic enough to the
Israeli killers, even had the audacity to describe
Israeli killings at the time as "targeted assassinations" when
even Israel had not invented that propaganda term back
then. He must have forgotten to remember. That's all.
Where do I begin. I mean yes, I was quite angry watching
it; and I got more angry as I watched the Berkeley
liberal audience react sympathetically to the movie,
rooting for the Israel head killer, as he went about his
"civilized" killing. I watched the audience
root for an Israeli killing team, and this WAS a true
story, and Palestinian victims were real people, with
real blood. The most emotional moment for Spielberg, and
presumably for American audiences was when the head
killer talked with his baby daughter in New York, that he
missed very much. Oh, ya. That was the point at which you
were expected to shed a tear or two; the music got
particularly sentimental at that point. It had to be.
But where to begin; the movie was based on a book that
took the Israeli account as it was delivered. But the
book was honest and more accurate at least on one count:
in the book by George Jonas titled Vengeance (only
Israelis are entitled to vengeance as you know, the more
violent the better as far as some US movie audiences are
concerned), the killers did not express regret or
second-thoughts. None. In the book but not in the movie,
the killers, according to Jonas, had "absolutely no
qualms about anything they did." How could Spielberg
miss that. Well, he just managed. Hell, that was the
whole movie, and the whole political project behind it.
Of course, it was not easy for me to watch this movie, I
mean not only at the political and intellectual levels,
but also at the personal level. I can connect to the
story, in its details and personalities. The first victim
of the movie was Wail Zu`aytir, and I knew his
niece; I went to school with Abu Hasan Salamahs
son--he was younger; and I knew the street and building
where the three PLO leaders were massacred in Beirut. And
let me tell you that NONE of the five people mentioned
here had anything to do with Munich--but more on that
later. NONE. But why should this movie, a
Spielbergs movie for potatos sake, bother
with facts, especially if they come in the way of a
smooth pro-Israeli narrative? But this movie is intended
for mass audiences who know nothing about the facts of
the conflict. That is exactly why it will work, and why
it will deliver the (propaganda) goods.
Let me start by saying this: this, Munich that is, was
not as planned an operation as has often been maintained.
This was not planned months in advance, as Abu Iyad
maintained in his account with Eric Rouleau (translated
into English as My Home, My Land by dear Linda Butler).
Abu Iyad for years exaggerated the claims about the
carefully planned operation, and PLO media at
the time lied about how the PLO gunmen threw grenades
into the helicopters, so as to make the last shootout
more of a fight that it actually was. Angry Palestinians
who were being hit by Israeli fighter jets in their
refugee camps demanded heroes and heroism, and the PLO
had to give them some, even if they were not legitimate
heroes. The German troops were going to take them out, no
matter what, and no matter how much they, the Germans in
this case, endangered the lives of the hostages - and
they presumably had Israeli consent.
The Arab League diplomat talked about this recently when
he broke his silence in an interview on Ziyarah Khassah
on Al-Jazeera. He should know: he was the negotiator with
the the Palestinian team in Munich. Yes, I know. It can
be argued that the Palestinian attackers risked the lives
of the hostages by taking them hostages, even if they did
not intend to kill them. That is true. This is like
hijacking: the hijackers, any hijackers, are responsible,
and should be held responsible for whatever endangerment
to the lives and health of victims. That is true. But it
is also true that the State of Israel has taken a nation
as a hostage, and has been endangering the lives of
Palestinians since the inception of the state of Israel.
This is why it is all a question of who is retaliating
against whom? One of the many false premises of the movie
is that Israel only went on a killing rampageand
only against Palestinian killers--after Munich.
That Munich was a watershed. Watershed it was not, except
in Israeli propaganda brochures. Israel has been going on
killing rampages against Palestinians, civilians mostly,
since before the creation of the state of Israel. And how
could you even talk about Golda Meir and forget to
mention her most memorable quote: that there is no
such thing as the Palestinian people. Spielberg
must have missed that, just as he needed to show her as
grandma goodness who was pushed into vengeance by
Palestinian cruelty. More humanization. That is why we
had to see the head Israeli killer with his child: you
need to see him as a human being.
Do you know that not a single Palestinian in the movie
appeared unarmed? They all were terrorists, and their
murder had to be justified, and Spielberg did a great
service for the state of Israel in that regard. They
should name some stolen Palestinian property in Israel in
his honor, I argue. A street, a destroyed Arab village,
or a stolen olive tree. Anything. He deserves it. And let
us see what Israel was doing before Munich. Before Munich,
NOT AFTERdid you get that, Israel placed a bomb
under the car seat of Palestinian writer/artist, Ghassan
Kanafani and killed him and killed his niece (14). The
niece was not plotting the Munich operation when she was
murdered by the Israelis; nor was her uncle. That was
BEFORE Munich. Kanafani was best friends with my uncle;
they both used to write in Al-Hurriyyah magazine during
their days at the Movement of Arab Nationalists.
Israel alsoBEFORE Munichsent a letter bomb to
Bassam Abu Sharif (a writer and journalist with the
PFLP), and left him with life-long scars and bodily
damage, and they also sent a letter bomb to Anis Sayigh,
a scholar and researcher, who was not a member of any
group. But he was a really diligent researcher, and Israel
did not appreciate it--I am assuming. This is not easy
for me; I have shaken the hands--or what was left of
their hands--of both of those men, and Abu Sharif never
had a military roleI say this although I never
liked Abu Sharif or respected him (read my review of his
memoir in Journal of Palestine Studies a few years ago).
But those were innocent victims of Israeli killing. They
never held guns those two, or those three, or four. This
story is personal for me, of course. I see them as human
beings, and not as armed and vengeful characters that
they appear in Spielbergs movie.
And typical of US movies where Arabs appear, Arabs when
they speak Arabic never need subtitles. We need them when
people speak in French and German, but Arabic is not
important. It is not important to know what cheap natives
say; we only need to know what expensive people say:
Europeans and Israelis. And do you notice that Hollywood
still portrays Israelis as Europeans: they still
dont want to accept that some half of all Israelis
come from Asian and African countries. This makes it
easier for the White Man to identify with them. And there
is this element that is never mentioned about Palestinian
attacks: and this is true of the present and of the past.
It is not that some Palestinian leaders recruit or compel
Palestinians to attack Israelis. It is the other way
round. Palestinians, regular rank-and-file and sometimes
civilians, pressure Palestinian leaders and commanders to
send them on military or suicidal missions against
Israeli targets. Munich occurred exactly like that.
Palestinians in the camps in Lebanon, those who were
trained by Fath and by other groups, were lobbying for
action. Why?, you may ask? Well, not only for
the loss of Palestine but also because Israelwas KILLING
Palestinians.
In February of the same year PRIOR to Munich, Israeli
jets bombed Palestinian refugee camps, and killed tens of
innocent people. This is what is missing in the movie,
among many other things. Most Palestinians who are killed
by Israelis are unarmed and are killed not by assassins
who are conscientious and sensitiveas they are
outrageously portrayed in this moviebut by pilots
who bomb refugee camps filled with unarmed civilians.
Palestinians who are bombed from the air, long before Munich,
are elderly and people and children in their beds. These
are the victims that you will never see in a Spielberg
movie. So Israel was killing Palestinians, and this was
the context of pre-Munich.
So a small group decided to do something, but they were
not sure what, and this was only 3 months before Munich.
And one of the handful of people who knew about this, and
this will never make it into the press was Abu
Mazin--yes, that Abu Mazen the head of the puppet
Palestinian Authority. But do you notice that US/Israel
always forgive the past of those who submit to Israeli
dictates? Look at how US and Israel forgave Anwar Sadat
for his anti-Semitic Nazi past. Abu Mazin was the money
guy, and he dispersed the funds for Abu Dawud, who
engineered the operation. And the American public in US
media and popular culture is so enamored with the Mossad,
that the image of the Mossad does not match its actual
reality.
The best evidence is this movie: look at this obsession
with Abu Hasan Salamah as the mastermind of Munich
when he had nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with Munich.
To be sure, Abu Hasan was a braggart, and had a big
mouth, and would take credit for things he did not do,
and would distance himself from failed
operations that he planned, like the Sabena
failed hijacking in 1972. That was Abu Hasan: he lived
the life of a playboy, and enjoyed a unique indulgent
pampering from Abu `Ammar who treated him like a son. Abu
`Ammar would never say no to Abu Hasan, on anything. But
Abu Hasan had nothing to do with Munich, and this
ostensibly all-knowing Mossad, did not know it, and
probably still does not know it. Former CIA director,
Stansfield Turner, once said that the Mossad is a
mediocre organization, but that it is outstanding in
PR--only in PR. Former CIA man in Beirut Robert Baer said
this about the Mossad--I am translating this from an
interview he gave to Al-Jazeera: Let me tell you
something, what people most err in in the Middle East,
and I am responsible for my words to the end, is related
to Israeli intelligence. To be sure, they can kill
somebody in Paris or Rome or killing the wrong person in Finland
or wherever else they did that in [he meant Norway]. To
be sure they know Europe and Palestinians, and they know
many things about Palestinians, but when it comes to the
rest of the Middle East, I have not seen anything from
their part that indicated their knowledge of those
countries.
But this can never be maintained in a country that wants
to exaggerate the prowess and knowledge of an
intelligence agency not only to help feed the Israeli
propaganda myth, but to also prepare the American public
for more ruthless times and ways. So a very small number
of people knew about it, and of course Abu Iyad was one
of them. And Abu Iyad is the most important person on the
list, and yet his name was NOT on the list, just to show
you about how much--or how little-- Israel knew. Abu Iyad
spoke more than he needed not only because he wanted to
send a message to the enemy, but also because the wars of
factions and "Abu"s within Fath necessitated a
game of one-up-manships, and of wild exaggerations at
times. And while Black September was a paper name, and
did not have a separate organizational existence or
structure, several factions used the name for their own
ends. Nobody consulted with Abu Iyad about Abu
Hasans use of the name for the Sabenas failed
hijacking mentioned above. Abu Dawud is a key person
here. And while his name was mentioned in passing, it was
added after the fact in Israeli propaganda accounts. Abu
Dawud was arrested in France for another reason in 1977,
and he was released because there were no German or
Israeli warrants about his involvement in Munich. That
shows you.
Now, I will not give a blow-by-blow account of Munich.
But I personally believe the account of Abu Dawud more
than I believe Spielberg, i.e. Israeli propaganda claims,
or even German police. (Abu Dawud's account is found in
Abu Dawud, Filastin: Mina-l-Quds Ila-Muikh (Beirut: Dar
An-Nahar, 1999)). German police lied quite a bit about
the case; they leaked to the press fanciful accounts of
Palestinian infiltration of the workforce at the Olympic
city, when none of that actually took place. They were
too embarrassed to tell the truth. Similarly, the
Israelis wanted to back the German account, especially as
the violence at Munich was a propaganda bonanza for the
Israelis in the West, just as Munichthis is not
known in the Westwas a propaganda bonanza for Fath
in the Middle East, as horrrific as the outcome was for
all. And in that sense, the Germans, the Israelis, and
Abu Iyad (and certainly Abu Hasan) lied about Munich, but
not Abu Dawud, in my opinion. Abu Dawud is one of those 2nd
tier PLO leaders who did not get corrupted in the messy
Lebanese scene, and who did now allow the Gulf money that
corrupted many PLO leaders to affect him. This was a man
who was in charge of Beirut during the Lebanese civil
war, and yet his name does not appear in any chronicle of
the war because he was too low key, and because he never
bragged. (Hell, he never talked even when the brutal
mukhabarat in Jordan held him from his feet for days,
while torturing him. People who saw him in jail at the
time did not recognize him. But you know this: your
reliable "moderate" friends in Jordan are quite
"good" in torture. They are probably the best;
they are helping you in that regard as we speak.) Most
Lebanese did not even know his name.
But this also explains why he survived, unlike say Abu
Hasan Salamah, who married a Lebanese former Miss
Universe, who introduced him to Lebanese bourgeois
society, and he could not get enough of that life. He
developed a routine, and lived in a fancy apartment on Madame
Curie Street in Beirut, and the routine he developed
(going to the GYM at the same time every day), made him
an easy target. Abu Hasan could get all the money he
wanted for his own group from `Arafat, and was doing a
good job of maintaining not only good relations with the
CIA but also with Lebanese right-wing groups. He became
good friends with some right-wing militia leaders. Read
the novel by Navid Ignatius, Agents of Innocence: it is
about Abu Hasan, although the author does not admit it.
It is interesting that in the movie, the Israeli head
killer (who was in the movie Troy), was cast to be most
appealing to the audience: a good looking and charismatic
figure. But say what you want about Abu Hasan (and many
people in Palestinian struggle, like Abu Dawud, did not
like him) but he was a good looking and charismatic
figure in real life, but not the actor who played him in
Spielbergs movie. But Spielberg did not want the
viewer to identify with any Palestinian in the movie:
that was contrary to him and to his political goal. He
just wanted to identify with the expensive human beings:
the Israelis.
The Arabs are worse than they were in Renoirs
painting, the Mosque, as an unidentifiable blob. They
were just armed, with no humanity. They were not supposed
to evoke emotions, and you were not supposed to see them
bleed, and if you did, you had to cheer for their
killers. The only ones that you had to feel sorry for:
were the Israelis who get killed, including the killers
when they kill. The music that played when Israelis die,
was different from the music that played when
Palestinians died. And no speaking roles for Palestinians
were necessary. Why bother. Give one a line, and you have
done your "objective" duty. And the list of
prisoners that attackers submitted to German authorities
did not have 200 Arab prisoners on it, as the
movie said. It had some 234 Arab and NON-Arab names on
them, including Japanese and German prisoners, but that
was not in the movie. And the statement that was issued
by the attackers gave a name to the
operation: Bir`im and Ikrit, names of two
(predominantly Christian) villages in northern Palestine,
the people of which were expelled by Israeli occupation
forces in 1948 for security reasons. In 1972,
the people of those villages petitioned the courts to
return to their villages, and the courts of course turned
them down. But if you were to use the name of the
operation you would have to tell the audience
those burdensome details that would have distracted from
the celebration of the Israeli killing machine.
But this begs the question: why is Munich more famous
than the savage bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps
back in February prior to Munich? And why did the letter
bombs to three Palestinian writers not get any world
attention? Why did American liberals and PEN not notice
it back then? Could you imagine what would happen if a
Palestinian threw even a rose at an Israeli writer? Could
you imagine what would happen among American leftists if
a Palestinian were to say even a bad word to Amos Oz for
example? That was the stature of Ghassan Kanafani among
Palestinians and Arabs.
Now, I will not get into the military/intelligence
background of the Israeli hostages as Abu Dawud does in
his memoirs because the attackers did not know that
information prior to the operation. Abu Dawud
gives many details about the military backgrounds of some
of the hostages, but I do not think that this is
appropriate because even Abu Dawud did not know that
before hand.
I will not get into what actually happened at the site at
the airport when the hostages were being transferred by
their captors not only because the captors were
responsible by virtue of the hostage
"operation", but you can raise questions
regarding the actual responsibility of the killing of the
hostages. Abu Dawud cites Israeli newspapers from the
1990s in which writers raised questions about German
responsibility, and on how the German government never
published autopsy reports of the hostages, etc. The
Israeli government also did not want to examine the
bullets that killed the Israeli hostages. That would have
settled the question, of course. Abu Dawud stressed that
the attackers were under strict instructions to not shoot
at the hostages, and you noticed in the scene, even in
the movie, that when they were storming the compound,
they clearly struggled with the door and avoided
shooting, while that could have shortened the time of
entry, and Abu Dawud says that they were under strict
instructions to avoid using the grenades. And Abu Dawud
raises the possibility that the helicopter may have
exploded from a bullet that hit it gas tank, but I
dont know, and I would never rely on Spielberg, or
on the silly book on which he based his account, for
historical accuracy.
And another thing comes to mind: Palestinians also have
managed to assassinate Israeli military and intelligence
leaders but that never gets attention because the trend
in US media and popular culture is that you should only
show Palestinians when they are killing civilians. And it
is not true that the Israeli response was confined to the
assassination of the 11 Palestinians as was shown in the
movie: Israel was also killing other Palestinians.
Israeli response or initiative we should call
it, was more massive and brutal that the operation of the
secret team. Three days after Munich, Israel ordered an
air strike which required the use of some 75 Israeli
aircrafts (the largest attack since 1967) and the attacks
on Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon
resulted in the killing of more than 200 mostly
civilians. And this is not because the Israelis knew that
there was a camp north of Sidon that was used for
training the Munich attackers. That camp was not even hit
(another sign that Israelis had no information about the
real culprits of Munich) and other camps with civilians
were hit. And then while the assassinations were taking
place, Israeli bombing of camps continued
uninterruptedly. And the most glaring omission in the
film, which shows you that the Israeli team was not only
savage but also ignorant of their targets, was what
happened on July 21st 1973, when `Ali Bushiki,
a Moroccan waiter resting with his pregnant wife around a
swimming pool in Norway, was murdered by that
assassination team merely because `Ali resembled what the
hit team thought Abu Hasan Salamah looked like. (The
Norwegian police tracked and arrested the killers, but
they were all released in a secret deal with the Israeli
governement--is that not nice?) Should that not have made
it to the movie? But that would have made them look more
brutally clumsy than Spielberg wanted them to look like.
And even Wail Zu`yatir, the PLO representative in Rome.
He knew nothing about Munich, and was an academic with
close ties to socialist circles in Italy. Zu`ytir was
shot 14 times. He never held a gun in his life. These
Israeli team members were killers who really relished
killing, and did not seem susceptible to moral
second-thinking as was stressed over and over again in
the movie. Zu`ytir was more interested in literature than
he was in military affairs, on which he knew nothing. And
PLO representative in France Mahmud Hamshari also had
nothing to do with Munich; Israeli propaganda later had
to contend with that, and claimed after killing him that
the attackers passed through France on their way to Munich.
In reality, the attackers never stepped on French soil
when they went to Germany.
And the movie, it seems really enjoyed covering the 1973
massacre in Beirut. Spielberg I could tell really enjoyed
learning and covering that massacre by Israeli terrorist
squads. But who were the three PLO personalities killed
in that "operation"? And who cares about the
details? Kamal `Udwan was the Fath/PLO leader responsible
for the West Bank and Gaza. He not only had no
responsibilities in Europe, but he opposed
operations in Europe, and even those by Black
September. More than that, `Udwan was one of the most
moderate Fath leaders having accepted the two-state
solution back in 1970, before any of his colleques in
Fath. Abu Yusuf An-Najjar was in charge of intelligence
in LebanonLebanon, not Europe. While `Udwan had no
knowledge of Munich, Abu Yusuf may have heard about it
but had no role whatever in it.
The third person was a poet: and you know how much
Israelis like to murder Palestinian poets, artists, and
writers. Kamal Nasir was a poet, and was killed in his
bed. The movie did not tell you that by the time the
Israeli terrorists finished with their
mission, some 100 Palestinians and Lebanese
were murdered on that day in April 1973. I also was
amused--not really--how Spielberg portrayed the
neighborhood where the PLO leaders AND others were
killed: it had all the features of Orientalist
imagination. It was traditional and the houses were old
styles with arches, and the place was protected like a
military base. In reality, the PLO leaders lived in a
residential building in the most modern and upper class
neighborhood of Verdun in Beirut. But why bother with
that detail too. And the Fath representative in Cyprus
also had nothing to do with Munich; he was the
intelligence envoy of Abu Yusuf An-Najjar.
Some people on the list of the Israeli murder team were
not only not involved with Black September, but some were
not even members of the Fath organization. Basil
Al-Kubaysi was a Palestinian scholar who had just
completed his PhD in political science; I recently had
dinner with Basils best friend in college in
Candada. Kubaysi was in the PFLP and not in the Fath
organization. The same for Muhammad Budia: he was with
Wadi` Haddad, and not with Black September. But then
again: I read that Spielberg offered the script to Dennis
Ross and to Bill Clinton to verify the
accuracy of Middle East political and
historical references. The two are experts on the Middle
East, in case you have not heard.
More than that, the movie did not tell you that on
September 16th, and 17th, Israel
launched a savage invasion of South Lebanon, erasing the
refugee camp of Nabatiyyah, and the Lebanese newspapers
at the time (I even remember that as a 12 years old) had
on the first page that famous picture of a smashed
civilian car with seven Lebanese civilians smashed inside
when an Israeli tank ran over the car near Jwayya in
South Lebanon. That must have been too messy for
Spielberg to cover. Why bother? And the car had stopped
at the Israeli checkpoint that was set up at the entrance
to the village. Were those civilians in the car also
involved in Munich? Later, as the movie ended, it was
written on the screen that Abu Hasan Salamah was later
assassinated. Spielberg forgot to add that he
was assassinated by a massive car bomb in a
crowded street in Beirut, which killed and injured tens
of peopleoh, and those people also were not
involved with Munich.
The reviews of the movie in US media almost expressed
frustration that Spielberg did not express enough
sympathy for the Israeli killers. Only Michelle Goldberg of Salon to her
credit (great review Michelle)[See
Below,JB,editor]pointed out that contrary to that
lousy review by Leon Wieseltier in the New Republic
many of those [Israelis] in Munichare, if anything,
slightly unbelievable in their constant
self-interrogation and closely guarded humanism. I
was thinking after the movie that public ignorance of the
Middle East greatly helps Israeli propaganda; this
explains why Zionist organizations express contempt and
wrath at Middle East expertise and specialty (as in MESA)
because those who get to know and learn about the Middle
East overwhelming find it difficult if not impossible to
consume the unbelievable dosages of Israeli propaganda
delivered via US media and popular and political
cultures.
*Three of the Munich Palestinian attackers survived. One
died from a heart attack; the remaining two
are...somewhere in the Middle East.
posted by As'ad @ 2:32 PM

The War on "Munich"
By Michelle Goldberg 
Neoconservatives launch a pre-emptive strike on
Spielberg's latest, which dares to break the rules of
post-9/11 political correctness.
Steven Spielberg's "Munich" doesn't open
until Dec. 23, but a backlash charging the film with
fuzzy-headed liberal naiveté and moral relativism began
weeks ago. Political critics are berating the movie for
suggesting that the violence wracking the Middle East is
a cycle that both sides have a part in perpetuating.
Spielberg, ironically, is accused of being insufficiently
Manichaean, and the charge threatens to ossify into
conventional wisdom before the movie's audience can get
to theaters to see how misguided it is. As New York
Times media columnist David Carr wrote in his
awards-season blog, "'Munich' finds itself in a
seemingly endless spanking machine." Spielberg's
film tells the story of the Israeli response to the
massacre of its athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the
1972 Munich Olympics. The killings were the work of Black
September, a terrorist wing of Yasser Arafat's Fatah
organization. Determined to both wreak vengeance and to
project a message of strength to the world, Israel
deployed hit squads from Mossad's Caesarea unit to find
and assassinate those behind the attack. Often, the men
who were directly responsible could not be located, and
so other Fatah activists with more ambiguous involvement
were targeted instead. The story is full of moral
ambiguities -- few would dispute that Israel had the
right to retaliate, but its pursuit of revenge became an
end in itself, sometimes compromising both Israel's
ethics and its own security.
The analogy to our own time is obvious, and in some ways
the argument about "Munich" is really one about
America. Post-9/11 political correctness, which demands
that stories about terrorism and counterterrorism be
limned in starkest black and white, seemed to have
dissipated these last few years. In the debate over
Spielberg's movie, though, it's returning with a
vengeance. The result is not just the mischaracterization
of a movie; it's the resurrection of the taboo against
depicting the war on terror in shades of gray.
The campaign against "Munich" started Dec. 9,
when the New Republic made Leon Wieseltier's biting
takedown of the film available early on the magazine's
usually subscriber-only Web site (and the Drudge Report
gave it a prominent link). Wieseltier called the film
"pseudo-controversial" and said it is
"desperate not to be charged with a point of
view." Then he excoriated its politics, his angry
tone suggesting the movie's message isn't so blandly
inoffensive after all. "No doubt 'Munich' will be
admired for its mechanical symmetries, which will be
called complexities," Wieseltier wrote, trying to
preempt praise for the film by dismissing those impressed
by it as bien-pensant fools.
"Really wrong"
New York Times columnist David Brooks followed two
days later with a condescending column lamenting
Spielberg's failure to portray the "evil"
driving Palestinian terrorism. "Because he will not
admit the existence of evil, as it really exists,
Spielberg gets reality wrong," Brooks wrote,
continuing, "In Spielberg's Middle East the only way
to achieve peace is by renouncing violence. But in the
real Middle East the only way to achieve peace is through
military victory over the fanatics, accompanied by
compromise between the reasonable elements on each
side."
The same day, Variety editor Peter Bart published
a dispatch about awards season campaigning. Noting that
Spielberg was lying low, he wrote, "Having gone to
such excruciating pains to explain that there is no
'right' and 'wrong' in the Middle East (thus adding to
the film's exhaustive length) the filmmaker
understandably wants to avoid the angst of the interview
circuit." (Variety had already given the
movie a scathing review.) The following day, the Israeli
newspaper Haaretz reported on Ehud Danoch,
Israel's consul general in Los Angeles, airing similar
criticisms. "According to Danoch, throughout the
film Spielberg equates the Mossad agents and the
terrorists," Haaretz wrote, quoting him
saying, "This is an incorrect moral equation. We in
Israel know this. There is also a certain pretentiousness
in attempting to treat a painful, decades-long conflict
by means of quite superficial statements in a two and a
half hour movie."
As the political attacks pile up, the real meaning of
"Munich" -- a flawed but powerful and, yes,
complex movie -- threatens to get lost amid all the
huffing and bleating. (Spielberg, it was reported Monday,
has even hired a top Israeli politico to help cushion the
film's release over there.) "There's been a huge
push from the people who have that kind of neocon
attitude about it to make sure that it doesn't get
grounding, to try to keep it from getting its
footing," says David Poland, editor of Movie City
News, an online magazine about the film industry.
"There is a public push to hurt the movie before it
even gets seen."
Vengeance and violence
That push won't be entirely successful --
"Munich" has already made the 2005 top 10 lists
of Time, Newsweek, Rolling Stone, People
and Entertainment Weekly. But the political
discussion around "Munich" has already been
framed in a way that obscures the film itself.
Spielberg's movie bears little resemblance to the
piece of mushy leftist agitprop its critics describe. It
does not suggest that terrorists and counterterrorists
are morally equivalent or that Israel is wrong to defend
itself. It is nonsense to say, as Wieseltier does, that
there "are two kinds of Israelis in 'Munich': cruel
Israelis with remorse and cruel Israelis without
remorse." I can't imagine how Wieseltier thinks
Israelis ideally should be portrayed, because many of
those in Munich are, if anything, slightly unbelievable
in their constant self-interrogation and closely guarded
humanism.
"Munich" is about the way vengeance and
violence -- even necessary, justified violence -- corrupt
both their victims and their perpetrators. It's about the
struggle to maintain some bedrock morality while engaging
in immorality. Spielberg goes out of his way to be
generous to Israel -- omitting, as I'll explain in a
moment, one of the Caesarea assassins' most high-profile
mistakes. But his film, co-written by engagé liberal
playwright Tony Kushner, does mourn the way Israel has
compromised its values in the fight against terrorism,
while leaving open the question of whether the
compromises were worth it. "Some people say we can't
afford to be civilized," says Golda Meir (played by
Lynn Cohen) early in the film, after the murder of the
Israeli athletes. "I've always resisted such people.
Today I'm hearing with new ears." Meir makes a
conscious decision to cross a moral line.
"Munich" is about the implications of that
choice, and its unintended consequences.
The film weaves this ethical drama into a jet-setting spy
thriller. It begins in the titular city, where a team of
Palestinian terrorists break into the apartments housing
Israel's Olympic delegation, killing one and taking 10
others hostage. The media concentration at the 1972
Olympics was unprecedented, and the drama was broadcast
around the world in real time. Spielberg largely lets it
unfold as a media event, showing it from the perspective
of rapt spectators, including horrified Israelis and
proud, ebullient Palestinians. It all culminates in a
firefight at a German airfield, seen as an explosion in
the background of a TV correspondent's report. The movie
includes the cruelly hopeful early reports, broadcast
worldwide, that the hostages were freed, which made the
truth -- that all were massacred -- even more
devastating.
The Munich massacre is but a prelude to the film, which
follows a five-man assassination team led by Avner
Kauffman (Eric Bana) as they track down and
systematically kill a list of Palestinians provided by
the Israeli government. The squad is scrupulous about
protecting innocents -- more scrupulous than their
real-life counterparts who, in a notorious 1973 case of
mistaken identity, killed an innocent Moroccan immigrant
in Norway, an incident left out of "Munich."
But some of them are also wracked with doubts and
questions about whether their mission is futile, whether
it is just, and whether they corrode the righteousness of
their own cause by aping their enemies' tactics.
Can't we all just get along
The characters' deep ambivalence about the revenge
killings they commit is actually profoundly flattering to
Israel. It is impossible to imagine such doubt, and such
an ardent desire to adhere to a higher standard than that
of one's enemies, among the film's terrorists. Indeed, I
would guess that many Palestinians would find the movie
unbearably self-congratulatory -- its central concern,
after all, is the effect of retaliatory Jewish violence
on the Jewish soul, not on the Palestinian flesh.
One of the film's most clarifying moments occurs when two
members of the team kill a European hit woman. She has
previously killed a member of their squad, and they take
time off from their official duties to have their
revenge. They find her at home, wearing a robe, and she
dies with it open, her naked body sprawled out
pornographically. Avner tries to cover her, but a
colleague yanks the robe back open. Later, this bit of
spite torments him -- "I wish I had let you close up
her housecoat," he tells Avner. These scenes
encapsulate "Munich's" concerns with the way
violence degrades both perpetrators and victims.
Spielberg isn't equating the Caesarea agent with the
assassin-for-hire he kills, but he is showing the way the
former loses a bit of his soul to hatred.
Yet even this much introspection and regret is considered
verboten among some of Israel's most doctrinaire (or at
least its loudest) partisans. The movie's reckoning with
the consequences of violence is being derided as mushy,
can't-we-all-just-get-along liberal pablum. Apparently,
people who really know how the world works -- people like
Brooks and Wieseltier -- know there's no room for such
sentimental qualms in wartime. "'Munich prefers a
discussion of counterterrorism to a discussion of
terrorism; or it thinks that they are the same
discussion," Wieseltier wrote in conclusion.
"This is an opinion that only people who are not
responsible for the safety of other people can
hold."
Puffed up with realist wisdom, Brooks informed us that a
film about targeted assassination is a "misleading
way to start a larger discussion," because the
tactic was one that Israel soon left behind. "In
1972, Israel was just entering the era of spectacular
terror attacks and didn't know how to respond. But over
the years Israelis have learned that targeted
assassinations, which are the main subject of this movie,
are one of the less effective ways to fight terror."
Israel, he continued, "much prefers to arrest
suspected terrorists. Arrests don't set off rounds of
retaliation, and arrested suspects are likely to provide
you with intelligence, the real key to defanging terror
groups."
As with so much Brooks writes, it's hard to tell whether
he's being intentionally or accidentally misleading.
Leave aside, for a moment, Israel's many assassinations
of Palestinian militants in the occupied territories in
recent years, including that of Hamas leader Sheik Yassin
in March 2004. As Aaron Klein -- a captain in Israeli
Defense Forces Intelligence -- reports in his new book,
"Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre
and Israel's Deadly Response," the hit squads
targeting the Munich plotters, far from being an
immediate and short-lived response to that horror,
continued operating for two decades. They killed Atef
Bseiso, the last man on their list, in Paris in 1992.
Israel's global legion of denouncers
As Klein reports, Bseiso, the PLO's liaison officer, had
relationships with many security agencies, including
France's Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire. His
assassination in Paris enraged the French. "The
Mossad is convinced that the French responded by
deliberately leaking the name of a high-ranking
Palestinian source in Arafat's Tunis office," Klein
writes. "The agent, Adnan Yassin, had been working
for the Mossad for years, informing them of all that
transpired in the office and among the Diaspora
Palestinian leadership. In October 1993, Yassin was
arrested, and never heard from again." The French
retribution, writes Klein, "handicapped Israel
during the sensitive negotiations leading up to the Oslo
Accords in 1993."
This episode doesn't appear in the film, but it
demonstrates that the questions raised by
"Munich" are not simply fodder for dilettante
cocktail parties. These are questions that are freely
discussed within Israel itself -- indeed, they obsess the
nation's thinkers -- and pondering them is in no way
anti-Zionist. JJ Goldberg (no relation), the editor of
the Jewish newspaper the Forward and an unequivocal
supporter of the Jewish state, called the movie "as
close as I've seen to an American film that's inside the
Israeli head." He's somewhat baffled by the attacks
on "Munich," including a negative review that
appeared in his own paper, which called the movie
"little more than a stylish bumper sticker -- well
meaning and eye catching but ephemeral, a deceptively
slight work that dissolves in its own seriousness."
Speaking of the consensus emerging around the film,
Goldberg suggested it's a kind of knee-jerk response by
people used to defending Israel against its global
legions of denouncers. Describing their thinking, he
said, "The world has condemned Israel, the world is
blaming Israel for the rise of Arab terrorism, there's
this conventional wisdom out there that Israel's
treatment of the Palestinians has created this
international wave of jihad terrorism, and so they're
looking for it" -- "it" being anti-Israel
sentiment. "They see the name Tony Kushner, and it's
like the script is written before they even get in the
theater."
Goldberg cited an apocryphal quote from Golda Meir:
"We can never forgive them for making us kill their
children." "In a way, the whole movie was an
elaboration of that line," he said. "There's
never a moment or hint that the Palestinians didn't start
it by doing something awful. And it keeps on reminding
you, the way Golda Meir did, that the people on the other
side, whatever else they are, they're also human beings.
"
In certain circles, apparently, simply calling attention
to the fact that the people killed by counterterrorists
are, in fact, people, is at best maudlin, at worst
disloyal. "It's very disturbing," said
Goldberg. "Something bad has happened. It's almost
as though Spielberg's warning about the corrosive effect
on the soul is all too true."
FOUND IN...
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