JANUARY 2006
News from the Balkans
ZNet Commentary
A "New Phase" in the Balkans[i] December 17, 2005
By Andrej Grubacic
The scandal which erupted after the recent Guardian interview with Noam Chomsky - that "exercise in defamation that is a model of the genre" (Chomsky) - is not, at least at first glance, completely unexpected: the Balkans, we can say with some pride, are back in style.
Once again, we can partake of journalists' uninformed inanities about Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia and other "permanent focalpoints of crisis" (Frankfurter Alemagne Zeitung), areas in which, on the edges of Europe, "insanity giggles" (Kundera), over in the distance, on a "doorstep of Europe" (Tony Blair), in the "black hole of our own Middle East" (Il Manifesto) where, in the autumn of European nationalism, peoples "imprisoned by history" (The Times) still await their "debalkanization" (La Republika).
The influential Italian politicalo magazine Limes, deprived of the gentle auto-irony that sometimes follows imperialist jargon, posed a key question: "who will debalkanize the Balkans?". Maybe, just maybe, are the peoples of the Balkans themselves capable of the Herculean task? Or does their historical slumber not permit them to do so? After Paddy Ashdown, that postcolonial Harry Potter, abandons this dark "region marked by unseen evils" (Berlin Zeitung), who will protect the Balkan peoples from the black magic of ethnic hatred?
Is it perhaps smarter that this peninsula, like Saramago's stone raft, be simply cut off from the Europe to which it doesn't, in any case, belong? To the sorrow and misfortune of the Balkan peoples, Western politicians, journalists and "Balkan experts" have still not given up on their civilizing mission in this exotic locale.
In his last address to the US Congress, Nicholas Burns brought out the past and future of US politics on the Balkans. He spoke mainly of Bosnia, which must immediately be given "greater stability", and Kosovo, which may, perhaps, "be ready for some form of conditional independence". In any case, it is absolutely necessary, according to Burns, to create a "new image of the Balkans". The new historical image of the Balkans originated in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in which the "international community" participated from the very beginning by bankrolling "democratic" opposition parties, which were in fact rabidly nationalistic, thereby lending legitimacy to violent secessionist movements, and by arming the ethno-nationalist paramilitaries which would eventually come to constitute new armed forces.
What do the Balkans look like today? They are a patchwork of nation-state remnants, such as Slovenia; the vassals of the international community, like Croatia and Serbia & Montenegro; and the three protectorates under military watch - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia (the latter facing the serious risk of a new civil war, potentially even more brutal than the one that ended in 2002).
When it comes to the protectorates, the "international community" has, to date, had two paradoxical solutions: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the imposition of a "multiethnic at any cost" approach, while in Kosovo, preparations are under way for a "monoethnic independence", at least partially due to the fact that after the occupation of this Serbian province ensued a year-long ethnic cleansing in the opposite direction - of which we hear almost nothing in the Western press - in which nearly all the non-Albanian inhabitants were exiled and over 150 monasteries destroyed.
But how do we explain the newly photogenic Bosnia and Kosovo? Perhaps it's best to start with Bosnia which one Russian journalist, correctly it would appear to me, calls the "model for Kosovo". In the Balkans, "success is a real rarity", writes Jonathan Steel, apparently relieved of the burden of the concerned European. Especially in Bosnia, which is more a " patchwork than a real state" (Politika Daily). Two so-called entities - the muslim-Croatian federation and Republika Srpska - have remained practically "irreconcilable enemies". This "Balkan colony of the international community" is made up of 10 cantons, 14 parliaments and 145 ministries.
Sound complicated? The peoples of Bosnia themselves remain perplexed more than 10 years after they were forced to accept this somewhat bizarre arrangement. Government administration accounts for 70% of the national budget. Social services and pensions must be paid out of the remaining funds even as the official unemployment rate in Bosnia hovers above 40%. What follows from this state of affairs? Empty government coffers and corruption so widespread that it is not "part of the system but is the system". An American diplomat with enviable cultural sensitivity, partial to invoking picturesque historical parallels, has said that, "Bosnia looks like the Wild West of our movies".
He's right. To date, more than two billion euros of international "donations" and "development aid" have vanished in Bosnia. Bosnia is an epicenter for arms and drug smuggling and trafficking in women, where local and especially international politicians collaborate with local criminals. Organized crime is the sole remaining domain of a multiethnic Bosnia.
Bosnia has been transformed into a protectorate-laboratory in which the "international community" observes how to transform "failed states"- from Kosovo to Iraq- into stable and obedient ones. Paddy Ashdown, our postcolonial Harry Potter, remains at the head of "Dayton's Bosnia". In January, however, Ashdown will be replaced as colonial governor, or to put it more formally, as the High Representative for Bosnia, by former German telecommunications minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Schwarz-Schilling already has nine years of experience as a samurai-diplomat of the international community.
He announced himself with racist, anti-Serb statements. According to the Berlin Zeitung, Ashdown, "a former member of the British Royal Navy accustomed to battling in close quarters, is leaving because he was unable to win substantial support during his mandate." He has been "criticized by Serbs, Croats and Muslims as an arrogant colonial ruler."
A shift change at the beginning of the year holds more than symbolic meaning: in 2006, the whole country is due for reorganization at the behest of the NATO leadership and according to the plans set by their "Balkan experts". It's two so-called entities, the Muslim-Croatian federation and Republika Srpska, are to be fused into one central state. This step is obviously tied into independence for Kosovo, which is explained as the wish of the "overwhelming majority of the Albanian population of Kosovo to form an independent state". The idea is very simple: if the Serbian part of Bosnia, as an entity with state-like characteristics, is dissolved, then Kosovo can be granted independence without fear that Republika Srpska will do what the "overwhelming majority of its population" wants - join Serbia & Montenegro.
Before we go on to Kosovo, however, it would be useful to briefly pause on the question of the Bosnian constitution. This document, at first glance, reflects a desire for the establishment of what in conventional political theory is sometimes called a "normal state" (the medical equivalent would be a "normal cancer"). But, just as in the case of the famous Dayton constitution the new text at issue was not only launched but also written outside of Bosnia. In fact, is the new constitution, from not only the perspective of conventional liberal political theory, but also in the historical context of Bosnia, without any engagement of the Bosnian people?
In other words, according to the diagnoses of Balkan experts, the people of Bosnia lack the requisite political capacity necessary to be credible on the question of their own constitution. Moreover, the design of the new constitution presupposes a situation in which, at a basic level, decisions are made in Washington and Brussels and carried out according to the political will of Brussels and the "high representative of the international community" who has the responsibility to instruct the Balkan tribes in the political culture. [ii]
The truth is that "it is time to rethink the way in which Bosnia is organized" but it is equally true that this project requires abolishing the insulting colonial institution of the high representative and his dictatorial authority and giving decision-making power over the constitution, number of entities and the cantons - the entire political process - and all else to those who actually live in Bosnia.
I've already mentioned that the development of the new Bosnian constitutional Frankenstein is linked to the "new phase" now beginning in Kosovo. The "new phase" is a phrase used by Kofi Anan, warning of the "necessity of beginning a new phase in the Kosovo political process". Kosovo, which is usually mentioned in the Western press only when some newsworthy violence erupts, is again a topic of diplomatic concern. The so-called status talks begin this month with an announcement first made by Washington's undersecretary of state, a task which fell to the US after a series of unusual coincidences. The UN has nominated a special negotiator, as has the EU.
Does that mean that one phase has already ended? As a reminder, the first phase of the "democratic project in Kosovo" encompassed no more and no less than the "development of democracy", "economic prosperity" and "recognition of the rights of minorities". Moreover, under the oversight of the NATO council and the UN, the current situation, already one of permanent post-conflict but especially in the aftermath of the attacks on the non-Albanian residents last March, has become increasingly unlivable.
The disputes can be summarized formulaically: as long as what Belgrade offers to Kosovo Albanians is "some more than autonomy but less than independence" while Kosovo politicians insist on "more than autonomy, not less than independence", the "international community's" "compromise solution" for this "immature political ambience" is preparation for "independence without autonomy".
Anan has nominated the diplomat and former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari as special envoy during the Kosovo negotiations. This nomination comes as no surprise. Few players on the international political scene have such a frighteningly efficient reputation as this former diplomat. Namibia, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Eritrea, and finally Aceh: Ahtisaari has always stuck his fingers into peaceful initiatives. Now it's Kosovo's turn. By founding the Crisis Management Institute in Helsinki, Ahtisaari sought to create a monopoly on peaceful conflict resolution: where the "international community" lights a fire, Ahtisaari arrives to extinguish it. All you need to do is call him.
This Finnish firemans' greatest success was the peaceful settlement in Aceh. If a "lasting compromise" in Kosovo is reached next year the Nobel Peace Prize will certainly not evade his humanitarian grasp, especially as he was already a frontrunner candidate this year.[iii]
Undersecretary Burns is also visibly worried about stability. Speaking to the US Senate, he opined that NATO will use force if any of the parties to the Kosovo status negotiations employ the threat of violence as a political tactic. In Burns's thinking, the talks may well "bring about independence". The Kosovo Albanians shouldn't rush to begin independence day celebrations just yet though, explained the undersecretary and Balkan expert with a schoolteacher's concern: "They need to prove that they are worthy".
When we compare Burns to his colleague however, former US special envoy for the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, the cowboy-undersecretary begins to look like a poster-boy for political correctness. Holbrooke, famous for his declaration that the "Serbs are shit people", on the occasion of the same Senate outing, said, with now celebrated candor, that Belgrade will have to find a way to let go of Kosovo. To that he added that the province's independence will inevitably lead to the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro's linkage. Among other things, both Burns and Holbrooke have supported a referendum on independence for Montenegro.
To Serbia, in exchange for Kosovo, a territory to which the people of this "primitive country" are somehow inexplicably "historically tied", they have offered an institutional promise: the magical delight of membership in European-Atlantic alliances. That is to say, as Burns emphasized, nations which contain within a "great territorial conflict" cannot be participants in this kind of integration. In the Balkans, this practice is well-known: in the 90s, local criminals promised security to storeowners in exchange for a cut of the profits.
The Kosovo negotiations, carried out by Serbian and Albanian political "elites" and unfolding under strong pressure from the "international community", may well, as a result, conclude with the termination of 1999's UN Resolution 1244 under which Kosovo "must remain a part of Yugoslavia". That means that for the first time since the end of the Yugoslav wars, a new Balkan border will be drawn along ethnic lines. We will have to wait and see what sort of an explosive charge this latest gambit by the "international community" holds. It may be quick and it will be fiery, in which case Anan may, in some fatal sense, turn out to be right: a "new phase" in the Balkans is indeed beginning.
*Andrej Grubacic is a historian and social critic from the Balkans. He can be reached at Zapata@mutualaid.org.
[iI wish to thank my dear friend Irina Ciric for her useful comments and for help with editing this article.
[ii] As British historian David Chandler correctly argues,
"Bosnia requires a state, government and constitution which are the product of the Bosnian people's engagement, interest and determination and I am not certain that this American suggested highest legal acts is the best solution. I think that the Americans are solving their own problems, not Bosnia's, because the Americans and all the others involved in the work of the office of the High Representative for Bosnia try to avoid responsibility and blame for the state of affairs in Bosnia, for the terrible economic situation, and especially for the desire of the youth to leave the country and their alienation from the political process".
[iii] Ahtisaari's deputy is Austrian diplomat Albert Roan, also an expert in "Balkan stabilization". In an interview with Austrian magazine Die Presse, Roan gave an overview of his mission to "Europe's stone raft": "We have to admit that the Europe of the 1990s betrayed the Balkans. We were unable to prevent war or extinguish crises. Europe did not exactly distinguish itself, but now we have a singular opportunity to once and for all stabilize the Balkans and the entire region, bringing the Balkans closer to the EU. Different obstacles stand in our way - Kosovo, the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, the Bosnian situation. Its imperative that its protectorate regime be transformed into a normal governing state." In Kosovo, "we have the opposite interests. We have to try to include the interests of the majority Albanian population in Kosovo, the Serbian population of Kosovo and Belgrade, and the interest of the international community in stability in the Balkans. The solution must not cause conflict. The problem arises if one side insists absolutely on its wishes. Then it will be difficult. One must be compromising. The solution must be lasting. It must be a guarantee of stability".
False
Dawn: Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton
By
Julie Mertus
November 23,2005
Foreign
Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
Ten years ago, I wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times urging that Kosovo Albanians be included in the Bosnia peace talks then being held in Dayton, Ohio. I warned that the nonviolent strategy of Kosovo Albanians was endangered by an increasingly impatient population which was beginning to believe that the United States would only recognize their plight if they took up arms.
The negotiating team in Dayton completely ignored my warning. The Milosevic regime, however, did not.
After the op-ed was translated into Serbian and Albanian and published in local papers, Serb police began rounding up my friends and acquaintances, questioning them about my human rights and humanitarian activities in the region. I found myself outside the country and unable to return. I knew I was on to something. When the violence continued to intensify in Kosovo, it was too late to bemoan the failure of the international community to act earlier.
Ten years have passed since the main parties to the Balkan Wars gathered in Dayton to hash out a cease-fire arrangement. Their agreement was praised for ending the brutal conflict in which civilians bore the brunt of wartime atrocities. Yet it was also roundly criticized for rewarding the aggressor and cementing ethnic tensions into the architecture of the new state. The signatories to the agreement included two politicians from neighboring states who had long disavowed their participation in the conflict: Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia's Franjo Tudjman. Cease-fire lines became the new boundaries of a most unusual new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In what is heralded as the most complex government structure of modern times, the Dayton Accord partitioned the country into two largely autonomous entities along ethnic lines, with a flimsy central government created which was to hold the complicated arrangement together. International oversight would be tight initially and gradually lighten as democratic local institutions were established, and international standards, which were enshrined in the Dayton Accord in record numbers, would be enforced. Most promising, we were told, the provisions of the most comprehensive and successful modern human rights treaty, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would be protected through a sophisticated system for human rights enforcement modeled after the highly respected European Court of Human Rights.
Bosnia watchers held their breath and hoped for the best.
A lot can happen in ten years, especially in the lifespan of a country. In the first ten years of its existence, Slovenia established itself as a working democracy with a dynamic civil society championing the rights of minorities. Ten years after the end of apartheid, South Africa found itself moving from the examination of past injustices to institutional reforms and other specific solutions designed to address the legacy of systemic inequities. Within ten years of calling it quits from the Communist bloc, what was once East Germany had been incorporated back into Germany , sending the business enterprises of the former East into competition in world markets.
Ten years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, Bosnia-Herzegovina should be similarly on the move. Instead, it barely has a pulse.
Sure, life without war is better than life with war, but life in Bosnia still lags behind European standards. To take one telling fact: In Bosnia, the expected death rate of children under the age of five is 18 out of 1,000—over three times higher than the rate for Slovenia, a country also emerging from the former Yugoslavia, which posts a rate of 5 out of 1,000. Over half the population does not have health insurance, and many of those who have health insurance cannot use it where they live. Public morale has hit a low point, according to local public opinion polls. The brain drain continues to plague Bosnia as many of the most talented and educated young people continue to flee their country for more promising futures elsewhere. While Bosnian city centers may sparkle, something is going dreadfully wrong below the surface.
A Pseudo-state
Ten years of tight international control has left Bosnia-Herzegovina with little ability to build its own capacity as a functioning state. There has been a transition, but it is not as promised. Instead of a transition from international to local control, power has shifted from the United Nations and the United States to the European Union. External control has only grown as the European Union now subjects Bosnia-Herzegovina to direct regulation.
Over time, Dayton Accord requirements for the observance human rights have become subordinate to requirements for European Union membership. The EU sets its own requirements and monitors Bosnia for its record of observance. In this mixed-up arrangement, the EU in effect negotiates with itself over governance in Bosnia . Local control is out of the question and the imposition of legislation by edict is the norm.
Still on life support from international donors, the economy of Bosnia putters along. A lack of transparency, accountability, and openness to participation threatens the legitimacy of local institutions. Citizens view their own public officials with great distrust and local businessmen with perhaps ever greater skepticism. In a recent BBC poll, 97% of Bosnian citizens viewed their government as corrupt. Indeed, Bosnia annually wins the distinction of being among the list of “most corrupt countries,” as compiled by the independent corruption watchdog group Transparency International.
Although “rule of law” projects have won international consultants long contracts in Bosnia—and, indeed, some of these projects have had a positive impact—the rule of law often takes a back seat to the rule of force. Both the Dayton Peace Accord and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina require cooperation with the war crimes tribunal. However, police often blatantly favor people from their own ethnic group, and Bosnian officials continue to refuse to cooperate fully with international efforts to try war criminals. With local courts ill-prepared to offer fair trials, and Bosnian authorities still unwilling to cooperate fully with international war crimes trials, many of the principle architects for mass killings in Bosnia remain at large.
One explanation for weak public understanding of, and support for, the rule of law, is the multi-level government structure which obscures lines of responsibility and makes accountability difficult and, at times, impossible. Also problematic is the decidedly undemocratic behavior of the international democratizers who appear to care little about local participation when it comes to decision making on international projects. The double standards governing international behavior has the air of “do what I say, not what I do.” No wonder Bosnians are cynical about democracy.
Another area of disappointment concerns “minority returns.” Although many refugees have returned home, the Dayton Peace Plan's vision for the safe return of all refugees has not been fulfilled. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people still cannot return home safely. People returning home to a situation where they are now ethnic minorities face violence, harassment, and discrimination. While much of the mistreatment is committed by private actors, the state is implicated both through its direct actions—for example, the failure to hire minorities for civil service jobs—and its failure to act to address harms committed by private citizens and businesses.
The fear that the Dayton Accord would intensify ethnic divides has proven to be well founded. One half of the country—the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—is largely viewed as the Muslim state, and the other half—Republika Srpska—is regarded as the Serb state. Croats, who on last count comprise 17% of the population, have no state. The election of stridently nationalist leaders remains common throughout the country. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo continues to unsettle prospects for long-term peace and justice in Bosnia.
Ten years ago, the international community failed to listen to the warning that peace in the Balkans can only come through a regional solution in which the concerns of all peoples are voiced and addressed. This time they should not make the same mistake. The newly announced Constitution warrants their full support and, in addition, the following challenges should be addressed.
Moving Forward
A lot can happen in the next ten years. A more optimistic future would require attention to several important challenges, including:
- Maintaining
international interest in the future of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, even as control over local
governance shifts to the local citizenry.
With international attention diverted to the
Middle East , this will be a difficult task. The
Balkans, however, still depend upon international
support for meeting the basic needs of their
citizenry. At the same time, Bosnia requires
ongoing assistance with human rights observance
and with building participatory democratic
institutions that can respond effectively to
human rights concerns over the long-term.
- Strengthening
the central government. The Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina must improve its capacity to
perform the basic tasks of a central government,
including the task of safeguarding the security
of the state. As a first step, the central
government should have control over one central
military; the two separate armies of the
sub-entities should be disbanded. The
ethnically-defined sub-entities will resist
centralization of the military and will struggle
against any effort to strengthen the central
government. Yet, even the most nationalist
leaders in the sub-entities can be convinced to
relinquish some control, if doing so is the only
path for self-preservation. Central to achieving
this goal, Republika Srpska should be warned that
its future does not include any kind of union
with neighboring Serbia-Montenegro.
- Continuing
to strive to meet European benchmarks while not
being driven solely by the quest for European
integration. EU standards are important, and
Bosnia should strive to achieve them,
particularly in the field of human rights.
Additionally, however, Bosnia should be able to
develop its own priorities for building its own
society. Given the freedom to make its own
agenda, Bosnia may in fact identify issues
unaddressed by the EU model and prepare
strategies that provide even greater protections
than that mandated through EU agreements.
- Increasing
opportunities for citizens to participate in
their own government, while preparing for the
new challenges that participatory democracy
brings. Participatory democracy is no guarantee
against the election of people who articulate
repulsive ideas such as chauvinistic nationalism.
Under the recent period of international control,
chauvinist nationalists elected through
procedures deemed by international observers to
be fair and free were simply removed by the UN
High Representative. A free and independent
Bosnia would have to live with all politicians
elected through fair democratic procedures. The
incentives for fostering civic education to
safeguard against a repeat of this scenario would
be great.
- Involving
more women in decision making over the future of
Bosnia, while not tokenizing women or setting
up women for failure. With very few exceptions,
all of the top decision-makers over the future of
Bosnia have been men. Certainly, women's
experiences, interests, and expectations vary
greatly from one another. But the future of
Bosnia cannot afford to neglect the interests of
half the population and to overlook the skills
that they may bring to policy-making. Not
tokenizing women will entail the inclusion of
women in large enough numbers, and mainstreaming
women at all levels, throughout all political
structures.
- Adopting a
new policy on “minority returns.” The
focus to date has been on facilitating the return
of displaced people to their homes, even when
doing so made them an ethnic minority. Many
people, however, are unwilling or unable to
return. Instead of continuing to insist on their
return, the international community should assist
people in their permanent relocation to new
homes. The international community should also
listen to Bosnian leaders who have proposed their
own solution to this problem, including the
strengthening of Bosnian institutions that
improve the quality of life for all residents,
such as healthcare institutions, child care
centers, and other social welfare mechanisms.
- Fostering
a better relationship with international courts,
even as local courts are strengthened. Republika
Srpska has come to be regarded as a “safe
haven” for ethnic Serbs under international
criminal indictment. The leaders of both of the
Bosnian sub-entities, however, could do more to
cooperate with the requests of the international
community for assistance with locating and
arresting accused war criminals. In particular,
they could direct their police forces to assist
with arrests. For its part, the central
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has generally
maintained a public stance of support for
international trials for war crimes, while also
failing to realize that support on a consistent
and effective basis. In general those whose
interests in the political status quo are
sustained by cooperation with the Tribunal, do
so. Where cooperation would seem to undermine
their political future, they do not. Under such
circumstances, the international community may
consider utilizing the very public award of
“carrots” (i.e., financial assistance)
as an inducement for cooperation with
international investigations.
- Improving public information about the transition process. The transition to local governance should be accompanied by an improvement in public information about the process. Citizen-led open dialogues, for example, could be held throughout Bosnia and formal procedures could be developed for hearing and including citizen input on major policy decisions. The improved flow of information would enhance the legitimacy of institutional change and, ultimately, its fairness and durability over the long-term.
Conclusion
The tenth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords reveals Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a troubled, ethnically divided state. Political leaders and civil society advocates throughout Bosnia have called for a comprehensive reconsideration of Dayton to address its deficiencies. The Dayton Accord may indeed have been the only possible solution for ending an atrocious war. But that time has passed, and much more can be done to promote a sustainable, long-term peace with justice in the Balkans. The new constitution presents a major step in the right direction. But without addressing the challenges outlined above, Bosnia will remain a country living between war and peace.
Julie Mertus, professor of ethics and international relations at American University, is the author of six books, including Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (awarded “human rights book of the year” prize by the American Political Science Association) and Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. She is a regular contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org).
Editor:
John Gershman, IRC
