A
Strategy of Lies: How the White House Fed the Public a
Steady Diet of Falsehoods
Bush administration officials are
probably having second thoughts about their decision to
play hardball with former US Ambassador Joseph Wilson.
Joe Wilson is a contender. When you play hardball with
Joe, you better be prepared to deal with some serious
rebound.
After Wilson wrote a critically timed New York Times
essay exposing as false George W. Bush's claim that Iraq
had purchased uranium from Niger, high officials in the
White House contacted several Washington reporters and
leaked the news that Wilson's wife was a CIA agent.
Wilson isn't waiting for George W. Bush to hand over the
perp. In mid-October, the former ambassador began passing
copies of an embarrassing internal report to reporters
across the US. The-Edge has received copies of this
document.
. The 56-page investigation was assembled by
USAF Colonel (Ret.) Sam Gardiner. "Truth from These
Podia: Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence,
Perception Management, Strategic Information Warfare and
Strategic Psychological Operations in Gulf II"
identifies more than 50 stories about the Iraq war that
were faked by government propaganda artists in a covert
campaign to "market" the military invasion of
Iraq.
Gardiner has credentials. He has taught at the National
War College, the Air War College and the Naval Warfare
College and was a visiting scholar at the Swedish Defense
College.
According to Gardiner, "It was not bad
intelligence" that lead to the quagmire in Iraq,
"It was an orchestrated effort [that] began before
the war" that was designed to mislead the public and
the world. Gardiner's research lead him to conclude that
the US and Britain had conspired at the highest levels to
plant "stories of strategic influence" that
were known to be false.
The Times of London described the
$200-million-plus US operation as a "meticulously
planned strategy to persuade the public, the Congress,
and the allies of the need to confront the threat from
Saddam Hussein."
The multimillion-dollar propaganda campaign run out of
the White House and Defense Department was, in Gardiner's
final assessment "irresponsible in parts" and
"might have been illegal."
"Washington and London did not trust the peoples of
their democracies to come to the right decisions,"
Gardiner explains. Consequently, "Truth became a
casualty. When truth is a casualty, democracy receives
collateral damage." For the first time in US
history, "we allowed strategic psychological
operations to become part of public affairs... [W]hat has
happened is that information warfare, strategic
influence, [and] strategic psychological operations
pushed their way into the important process of informing
the peoples of our two democracies."
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced plans to
create an Office of Strategic Influence early in 2002. At
the same time British Prime Minister Tony Blair's
Strategy Director Alastair Campbell was setting up an
identical operation in London.
White
House critics were quick to recognize that
"strategic influence" was a euphemism for
disinformation. Rumsfeld had proposed establishing the
country's first Ministry of Propaganda.
The criticism was so severe that the White House backed
away from the plan. But on November 18, several months
after the furor had died down, Rumsfeld arrogantly
announced that he had not been deterred. "If you
want to savage this thing, fine: I'll give you the
corpse. There's the name. You can have the name, but I'm
gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done
-- and I have."
Gardiner's dogged research identified a long list of
stories that passed through Rumsfeld's propaganda mill.
According to Gardiner, "there were over 50 stories
manufactured or at least engineered that distorted the
picture of Gulf II for the American and British
people." Those stories include:
The link between terrorism, Iraq and 9/11
Iraqi agents meeting with 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta
Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons.
Iraq's purchase of nuclear materials from Niger.
Saddam Hussein's development of nuclear weapons.
Aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons
The existence of Iraqi drones, WMD cluster bombs and Scud
missiles.
Iraq's threat to target the US with cyber warfare
attacks.
The rescue of Pvt. Jessica Lynch.
The surrender of a 5,000-man Iraqi brigade.
Iraq executing Coalition POWs.
Iraqi soldiers dressing in US and UK uniforms to commit
atrocities.
The exact location of WMD facilities
WMDs moved to Syria.
Every one of these stories received extensive publicity
and helped form indelible public impressions of the
"enemy" and the progress of the invasion. Every
one of these stories was false.
"I know what I am suggesting is serious. I did not
come to these conclusions lightly," Gardiner admits.
"I'm not going to address why they did it. That's
something I don't understand even after all the
research." But the fact remained that "very
bright and even well-intentioned officials found how to
control the process of governance in ways never before
possible."
A Battle
between Good and Evil
Gardiner notes that cocked-up stories about Saddam's WMDs
"was only a very small part of the strategic
influence, information operations and marketing campaign
conducted on both sides of the Atlantic."
The "major thrust" of the campaign, Gardiner
explains, was "to make a conflict with Iraq seem
part of a struggle between good and evil. Terrorism is
evil... we are the good guys.
"The second thrust is what propaganda theorists
would call the 'big lie.' The plan was to connect Iraq
with the 9/11 attacks. Make the American people believe
that Saddam Hussein was behind those attacks."
The means for pushing the message involved: saturating
the media with stories, 24/7; staying on message; staying
ahead of the news cycle; managing expectations; and
finally, being prepared to "use information to
attack and punish critics."
Audition in
Afghanistan
The techniques that proved so successful in Operation
Iraqi Freedom were first tried out during the campaign to
build public support for the US attack on Afghanistan.
Rumsfeld hired Rendon Associates, a private PR firm that
had been deeply involved in the first Gulf War. Founder
John Rendon (who calls himself an "information
warrior") proudly boasts that he was the one
responsible for providing thousands of US flags for the
Kuwaiti people to wave at TV cameras after their
"liberation" from Iraqi troops in 1991.
The White House Coalition Information Center was set up
by Karen Hughes in November 2001. (In January 2003, the
CIC was renamed the Office for Global Communications.)
The CIC hit on a cynical plan to curry favor for its
attack on Afghanistan by highlighting "the plight of
women in Afghanistan." CIC's Jim Wilkinson later
called the Afghan women campaign "the best thing
we've done."
Gardiner is quick with a correction. The campaign
"was not about something they did. It was about a
story they created... It was not a program with specific
steps or funding to improve the conditions of
women."
The coordination between the propaganda engines of
Washington and London even involved the respective First
Wives. On November 17, 2001, Laura Bush issued a shocking
statement: "Only the terrorists and the Taliban
threaten to pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail
polish." Three days later, a horrified Cherie Blaire
told the London media, "In Afghanistan, if you wear
nail polish, you could have your nails torn out."
Misleading
via Innuendo
Time and again, US reporters accepted the CIC news leaks
without question. Among the many examples that Gardiner
documented was the use of the "anthrax scare"
to promote the administration's pre-existing plan to
attack Iraq.
In both the US and the UK, "intelligence
sources" provided a steady diet of unsourced
allegations to the media to suggest that Iraq and Al
Qaeda terrorists were behind the deadly mailing of
anthrax-laden letters.
It wasn't until December 18, that the White House
confessed that it was "increasingly looking
like" the anthrax came from a US military
installation. The news was released as a White House
"paper" instead of as a more prominent White
House "announcement." As a result, the idea
that Iraq or Al Qaeda were behind the anthrax plot
continued to persist. Gardiner believes this was an
intentional part of the propaganda campaign. "If a
story supports policy, even if incorrect, let it stay
around."
In a successful propaganda campaign, Gardiner wrote,
"We would have expected to see the creation [of]
stories to sell the policy; we would have expected to see
the same stories used on both sides of the Atlantic. We
saw both. The number of engineered or false stories from
US and UK stories is long."
The US and
Britain: The Axis of Disinformation
Before the coalition invasion began on March 20, 2003,
Washington and London agreed to call their illegal
pre-emptive military aggression an "armed
conflict" and to always reference the Iraqi
government as the "regime." Strategic
communications managers in both capitols issued lists of
"guidance" terms to be used in all official
statements. London's 15 Psychological Operations Group
paralleled Washington's Office of Global Communications.
In a departure from long military tradition, the
perception managers even took over the naming of the war.
Military code names were originally chosen for reasons of
security. In modern US warfare, however, military code
names have become "part of the marketing."
There was Operation Nobel Eagle, Operation Valiant
Strike, Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Enduring
Freedom, Operation Uphold Democracy and, finally,
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The
"Rescue" of Jessica Lynch
The Pentagon's control over the news surrounding
the capture and rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch receives a
good deal of attention in Gardiner's report. "From
the very beginning it was called an 'ambush',"
Gardiner noted. But, he pointed out, "If you drive a
convoy into enemy lines, turn around and drive back, it's
not an ambush. Military officers who are very careful
about how they talk about operations would normally not
be sloppy about describing this kind of event,"
Gardiner complained. "This un-military kind of talk
is one of the reasons I began doing this research."
One of the things that struck Gardiner as revealing was
the fact that, as Newsweek reported: "as soon
as Lynch was in the air, [the Joint Operations Center]
phoned Jim Wilkinson, the top civilian communications
aide to CENTCOM Gen. Tommy Franks."
It struck Gardiner as inexplicable that the first call
after Lynch's rescue would go to the Director of
Strategic Communications, the White House's top
representative on the ground.
On the morning of April 3, the Pentagon began leaking
information on Lynch's rescue that sought to establish
Lynch as "America's new Rambo." The Washington
Post repeated the story it received from the
Pentagon: that Lynch "sustained multiple gunshot
wounds" and fought fiercely and shot several enemy
soldier... firing her weapon until she ran out of
ammunition."
Lynch's family confused the issue by telling the press
that their daughter had not sustained any bullet wounds.
Lynch's parents subsequently refused to talk to the
press, explaining that they had been "told not to
talk about it." (Weeks later, the truth emerged.
Lynch was neither stabbed nor shot. She was apparently
injured while falling from her vehicle.)
Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers let the story stand during an
April 3 press conference although both had been fully
briefed on Lynch's true condition.
"Again, we see the pattern," Gardiner observed.
"When the story on the street supports the message,
it will be left there by a non-answer. The message is
more important than the truth. Even Central Command kept
the story alive by not giving out details."
Gardiner saw another break with procedure. The
information on the rescue that was released to the Post
"would have been very highly classified" and
should have been closely guarded. Instead, it was used as
a tool to market the war. "This was a major pattern
from the beginning of the marketing campaign throughout
the war," Gardiner wrote. "It was okay to
release classified information if it supported the
message."
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Fwd.from joe bryant
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