One constitutional expert who closely monitors the United Nations says it is obvious where the blame lies.
''It is clear that the United States and France violated the U.N. charter as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, with respect to their criminal treatment of President Aristide'', says Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law.
Boyle told IPS that Aristide still remains the lawful president of Haiti, a member state of the United Nations. He said Annan should have publicly taken that position, and the Security Council should have demanded Aristide's immediate return to Haiti.
''The fact that they did not demonstrates the continuing and further degradation of the Office of the Secretary-General, the U.N. Secretariat and the Security Council under this current regime of U.S. hegemony,'' said Boyle, author of 'Destroying World Order.'
Just days prior to Aristide's flight from Haiti the Security Council denied his request for military intervention to quell the uprising, but it authorised an international military force just hours after he left the country.
Boyle said it is important for CARICOM to take the matter to the 191-member U.N. General Assembly, ''in order to uphold the integrity of the U.N. Charter, which Annan and the Security Council have repeatedly failed and refused to do.''
Boyle also urged the Caribbean nations and other states to sue both the United States and France for violating the 1973 Convention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, ''in order to have the World Court as well condemn what these two malefacting states have done to Haiti and President Aristide, and to secure his return to Haiti by means of an ICJ order.''
''The alternative is even more international chaos and anarchy, and a continuing gradual descent into world war -- like what happened to the League of Nations in the 1930s,'' Boyle added.
20th 2004:CARACAS, Venezuela -- Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez snubbed the United States and
courted Caribbean sympathy Tuesday by offering refuge to
ousted Haitian leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whom he
called Haiti's legitimate president. "We don't
recognize the new government of Haiti. The president of
Haiti is called Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was elected
by his people," the
Memorandum to the Press 04.13 Monday, March 8,2004
Haiti Under U.S. Tutelage and Control
Its a win for Secretary of State Powells confused, contradictory and hypocritical policy, but does it advance authentic U.S. national interests?
Powells vision for Latin America is now indistinguishable from that of his junior hemispheric policymaking ideologues, Noriega and Reich. The battle for the Secretary of States soul has ended in a rout for those who had highly regarded the man they thought he was, in contrast to the man he turned out to be.
The conflagration on the island hasnt ended; it will continue to burn down the countrys constitutional structure and eat away at what small chance Haiti had to evolve into a stable democratic society.
Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Canada,Jamaica, the U.S., the OAS, CARICOM, the UN and Haiti heroes and trimmers.
Less through confusion than by design, by belatedly introducing this countrys and other foreign forces into Haiti, Washington has guaranteed that Haitis now deeply scarred society is unlikely to easily recuperate from the wounds inflicted on it by an array of villains, both foreign and domestic. While many in both of those categories are destined to face the scrutiny of objective critics in the months and years to come, none of their reputations are more likely to be tarnished by the role that they played in bringing down President Aristides constitutional rule, than Secretary of State Colin Powell. In effect, he willingly became the captive of the Bush administrations obsessive right-wing ideologuesthe fateful sons of former Senator Jesse Helmsled by Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega, Deputy Assistant Secretary Dan Fisk, and White House aide Otto Reich.
First there were Powells earlier and highly criticized efforts to assure the American public of the reliability of what turned out to be either fake or exaggerated intelligence findings regarding the intent and capacity of Saddam Hussein to resort to weapons of mass destruction, which provided the justification for Washingtons controversial decision to go to war against Iraq. Now we have just witnessed the extraordinary shifts and duplicity of what only charitably can be described as Powells Haitian diplomacy. His behavior has destroyed any illusion that the Secretary of State could be relied upon to control the two changeling political appointees who had been pushed upon him by Miamis clout with the White House- Noriega and Reich.In the end, Powells already fading reputation for moderation was not to be found when it came to Haiti.
Powells End Game
Powells Haitian policy was dazzlingly inept. Recalling that only days before Aristide was put on a plane on February 29 for his flight into exile in the Central African Republic, which the State Department had ordered and arranged, the Secretary was repeatedly acknowledging the legitimacy of Aristides rule and denouncing the thugs making up the violent opposition, insisting that they would not be allowed to shoot their way to power, nor would Aristide be asked to resign. Once becoming more engaged, Powell began insisting that the anti-Aristide political opposition must negotiate with the government and that Washington would not sanction regime change or insist upon Aristides forced ouster. Then, scarcely twenty-four hours before Aristides induced flight, Powell reversed himself by ignoring Haitis constitution, which stipulates that a president can only convey his resignation to the countrys legislature, and not to Washingtons self-denominated viceroy, in implementing the script to abduct Aristide.
If Powell really meant his words at the time, then why didnt he stick by them, since Aristide had done nothing to justify this 100 percent reversal in the U.S. stand. While Powells rhetoric at the time appeared to represent the high road on the issue, he continuously was being undermined by Noriega and Reich in their off-the-record briefings to journalists and other interest parties. In contrast to Powells line, these press sessions implied that regime change was very much an option, and that Aristide could be muscled aside in any negotiation process.
Less than Meets the Eye
All along, when it came to Haiti, Powells defense of democracy was more apparent than real. To begin, the U.S. embassy in Port-Au-Prince was rarely a passive bystander to Haitis ongoing violence. In effect, Ambassador Foley, just as was the case with his recent predecessors at the Port-au-Prince post, saw his embassy as Fort Apache, and that the local restless Indians had to be kept in place through the use of an agile and an exceedingly active embassy playmaker who would call the shots that would determine Haitis ultimate fate. The cumulative result was that the space left to President Aristide to publicly function continued to atrophy until last month, when his position had become all but untenable.
Just as in Venezuela two years ago, where a failed coup had been hatched against President Hugo Chavez thanks to the political backing and covert funding provided by the then chief U.S. regional policy maker, Otto Reich, a markedly similar scenario has just been witnessed in Haiti. This approach represented an almost farcical evasion of hemispheric obligations on the part of U.S. coup plotters, in order to provide legal cover for their patently illegal actions.
indisputable contravention of its O.A.S. responsibilities
under resolutions signed by the U.S. over the past decade
in Santiago and Lima, which were aimed at mandating
democratic legitimacy throughout the hemisphere, the U.S.
turned out to be the lead co-conspirator in planting a
hatchet in Haitis civil society. This was the
culmination of its long-sought foreign policy goal of
either eliminating or bypassing Aristide and somehow
voiding his inconvenient but undeniable democratic
credentials, in order to either drain him of his
agenda-setting powers or, preferably, getting rid of them
and him as well.
It was not only the U.S. which has had its bona fides seriously compromised by the extorted resignation of Aristide. Reminiscent of Ethiopias Haile Selassis mournful appearance before the League of Nations in Geneva in 1936, where he pleaded for help to suppress Mussolinis legions, only the English-speaking Caribbean, led by Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson, displayed any spunk in challenging the inelegant U.S.-orchestrated game plan.
As the crisis began to mount last December and the political opposition became more assertive in the streets of Port-Au-Prince, the U.S. strategy to resolve Haitis political crisis began to take form. It was based on preposterous assumptions as well as cynical planning. A U.S.-sanctioned international peace force would be introduced into Haiti, but only to uphold a prior political agreement to be fashioned between Aristide and the Port-Au-Prince-based political opposition, led by the businessmen dominated Group of 184. The central credo of the latter body was that it would not, under any circumstances, carry on a dialogue with Aristide. Since there were to be no negotiations, there could be no agreement. But according to Powells pharisaical formula, there would be no peacekeeping initiative unless such negotiations took place and a resolution achieved. Yet it was Aristide who conceded to every demand made on him by the O.A.S., the E.U. (especially France), the U.N., the U.S., and the CARICOM nations. He was also repeatedly denounced by Powell and the international community for his obstructionism, and rarely the opposition, which saw its vested interest intrinsically better served by chaos than peace. This was a solid strategy on the oppositions part, because it knew that it lacked the popularity to win the elections which successful talks inevitably would help bring about.
All Dishonorable Men
Powells thesis that a political solution must precede the arrival of a peace force was indefensible on grounds of elemental logic. One would think that such an envisaged peace force would be much more urgently needed while violence was occurring, and Aristide was dangerously tottering, rather than after a peace agreement had been achieved. Demonstratively, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France and for that matter, the U.N. and the O.A.S., signed on to Powells diktat strategy of taking no action until it was too late to save Haitis now fatally blasted democratic germ plasm. In the manner of a blow hard, Powell later blamed Aristide for dilly-dallying; however it was Powell who was fruitlessly using up the Aristide governments precious remaining moments with inaction, even though there was time enough for the U.S. to demonstrate it meant to induce continued democratic rule. One would expect limp wrist behavior from an already discredited Secretary-General Gaviria of the O.A.S., or from President Lagos of Chile, whose unregenerate military under Gen. Pinochet routinely tortured and murdered anyone with Aristides radical agenda. This assignment of his Hessians was a small enough payment to be made by the former self-described socialist leader to show Chiles gratitude to the White House for entering into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with it. Meanwhile, Brazils Lula de Silva meekly prepared his troop contingents to be dispatched to the island, all after the fact, while Kirchners Argentina chose to sit out of the controversy altogether, both of the latter not bothering to significantly comment on Powells preposterous formulations.
Canada Presents No Problems
Predictably, Canadas new prime minister, intent on improving relations with Washington, accepted Powells snake oil formula for all-but-guaranteeing Aristides eventual ouster. Such a policy ill-served his countrys constructive reputation for fielding a somewhat less patronizing attitude to the rest of the region than its U.S. neighbor. Ottawas supine accommodation to Powells illusory timetable for when to intervene was pathetic, particularly since the governing Liberal Party was part of the problem for not having allowed its police trainers to remain in Haiti long enough back in 1994-96 to adequately carry out its failed commitment to professionalize the countrys security force.
The near silence of Mexico over Haiti on the eve of President Foxs visit to the Bush family ranch was sadly understandable, given the Mexican leaders lonely, if desperate quest for immigration reform, but the silence by the regions other heavy hitters was totally incomprehensible. At the end of the day, standing almost alone, it was Jamaicas prime minister, P.J. Patterson, who upheld the regions honor by implicitly rebuking the timidity of other hemisphere leaders in their hiding behind Jesuistic reasoning to justify their decisions to be irrelevant and indifferent to the fateful interruption of the democratic process in Haiti. Patterson took this stand in spite of the vulnerability of Jamaicas sagging economy and its need for Washingtons financial backing.
Aside from Powell, the world leader most deserving of derision is Frances Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Seemingly, the French diplomat at first boldly confronted the rapidly deteriorating situation in Haiti by calling for action on an urgent basis to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the country, but he then contracted his profile on the issue by completely embracing Powells thesis that a political solution must precede dispatching any peace forces. With this acquiescence,Washingtons position of stalling on any action until the demise of Aristides rule was a done deal, with the French official amiably falling on his sword after proving of less honorable stature than he would have had the world and Washington believe.
Powells Tainted Role
U.S. Embassy authorities were able to thrust a resignation letter into Aristides hands for him to sign, under the implicit threat that this was the only way for him and his family to be flown out of the country to safety. Once airborne, Aristide was only told of his ultimate destination of the Central African Republic a half hour before his scheduled landing, which flouted the utter contempt in which the Haitian leader was held by U.S. officials. Powells defense of this scenario was based on his now thoroughly revised line that Aristide was a flawed president deserving of his fate, as if the tattered remnants of the Secretary of States own reputation were something else.
The embassys arrangement of Aristides exodus, including its denial to him of communication access to the outside while he was being flown to Africa, was particularly outrageous and already is drawing a wave of negative reactions from all over the world. Powells conduct of U.S.-Haiti policy should be seen for what it was - a flagrantly callous treatment of a man who was no less worthy than his Washington counterpart. In this context, Powell must accept that for the best of reasons his protracted honeymoon with the public is now at an end, and his moral code is seen as being all but indistinguishable from that of Noriega and Reich. In reality, Powell already had given himself away earlier when he demanded that the Mexican and Chilean presidents sack their UN ambassadors for opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Today Haiti is a horrific mess, but that shouldnt be solely attributed to President Aristides flawed performance, as the U.S. Secretary of State all too facilely maintains. If Aristide was flawed, it was largely due to the impossible conditions laid down by Washington for him to rule. Powell bought his hardliners interpretation of events by caving in to the Miami-bred zealotry of his Latin American policy makers, thus hopelessly exacerbating Haitis last three years of strife and misery. By sanctioning the continued freeze of $500 million in multilateral assistance to Haiti on the exaggerated pretext of irregularities in the presidential and senatorial elections in 2000, one has the perfect parallel with his illusory statements to Congress and to the American public over Iraq. But just as Powell had insisted that sound intelligence existed when he passionately validated the entirely erroneous belief that Iraq posed an urgent threat, he again presented an entirely false picture of the causative agents of Haitis political and economic difficulties to the American public and what this country has been doing to redress them.
A Bankrupt Policy
There is simply no disputing the fact that the extremism and mean spirited nature of Washingtons Haitian policy helped to prevent democratic practices from taking root on the island. Secretary of State Powell must be condemned for sponsoring a policy that was superficial, illogical, narrowly conceptualized and damaging both to the U.S. national interest and Haitis most basic needs. Any hope that the kind of human misery propelling tens of thousands of Haitians over the past decade to risk their lives trying to reach south Florida, can be assuaged by throwing the country open to a political process which has no natural heroes nor any reason for its citizenry to trust their new U.S.-imposed officials, deserves to be seen as only one more of Powells illusions.
The above memorandum, authored by Council on Hemispheric Affairs director Larry Birns, with the assistance of COHA Research Associate Jill Shelly, is an adaptation of an article that will appear in the forthcoming issue of In These Times.
Issued 8 March, 2004
AN ALTERNATIVE AMERICAN VIEWPOINT from Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF)
Haiti: Dangerous Muddle
In 1994, when President Bill Clinton sent 20,000 American troops into Haiti to restore Jean-Bernard Aristide to the presidency, there was widespread support for a mission aimed at restoring democracy and relieving the misery of the Haitian people. It also seemed to herald a new day in the post-cold war world, when American invasions were not automatically synonymous with supporting some Latin American caudillo or South East Asian despot.
With the exception of the isolationist Right, virtually every voice in the political spectrum cheered the policy of "liberal intervention." The use of American power to make good things happen was a heady drug.
Unfortunately, an addictive one.
Although there is no question that the 1994 intervention was good for Haiti, military intervention has turned out to be fraught with problems, particularly when it is wielded by one country.
Seven weeks after the invasion, the Republicans took control of Congress and systematically dismantled aid to the impoverished, war-torn country.
The cuts meant there was no effort to rebuild roads, ports, airports, or infrastructure. When Aristide's opposition cried foul over eight contested seats in the 2000 election, the U.S. froze the final $500 million in aid.
The aid was never very substantial. Per capita, the U.S. was giving Haiti one fifth what it was spending in Bosnia, and one tenth what it was distributing in Kosovo. After 1996, U.S. aid to Haiti was the same as what it had given the dictatorship that deposed Aristide. Aid did flow, but not to Aristide. Instead, U.S. organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funnelled hundreds of thousands of dollars to the opposition.
Shortly after the demonstrations and attacks on Aristide began, the U.S. State Department made it clear it would do nothing to impede his overthrow. In early February, an anonymous State Department official told the New York Times that the U.S. was not adverse to replacing Aristide, "When we talk about undergoing change in the way Haiti is governed, I think that could indeed involve changes in Aristide's position," the official said. Shortly before Aristide was driven out, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and President George W. Bush, essentially called for him to step down.
There is no question that the Aristide government was a troubled one, and some of the opposition was composed of former supporters alienated by corruption, violent pro-Aristide gangs, and the contested 2000 election. Most of this group was non-violent, and based mainly among Haiti 's elites and the business community. But the forces that converged on Port au Prince are the very thugs and murderers the U.S. invaded to get rid of in 1994.
Louis-Jodel Chamblain, one of the principal leaders of the armed opposition, is a former death-squad leader and one of the founders of the brutal Front for the Advancement of Progress in Haiti (FRAPH) that killed thousands of people between 1991 and 1994.
The shady nature of people like Chamblain and Andre Apaid of Group 184, has deeply worried human rights groups, and generated some anger in Washington. U.S. Representatives Barbara Lee (D-Ca) and Maxine Waters (D-Ca) have both challenged the "neutrality" of the U.S. State Department. In a recent letter to Powell, Lee wrote, "with all due respect, this looks like regime change." It would appear that Lee was right on target.
There is reason to suspect the two men in charge of diplomacy in the region. Otto Reich , U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), played an important role in the coup attempt against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Noriega, has been a long-time critic of Aristide.
Whether through enmity or indifference, U.S. fingerprints are all over the overthrow of Aristide.
The U.S. should immediately take the matter to the UN Security Council, with a parallel effort in the OAS and Caricom. The Haitian opposition members--both nonviolent and violent--should understand that they have no automatic claim to political legitimacy. The hasty departure of the country's duly elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the sad result of the threat of massive political violence by feared former members of Haiti's security forces and intense strong-arming and political pressure by the U.S. government. If President Aristide did resign as has been widely reported, then Haiti's interim government should call quickly for new elections under multilateral supervision. What's more, all U.S. aid should be released immediately, and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should back off from their austerity prescriptions, which would only serve to further impoverish the poorest country in the hemisphere.
There are those who dismiss the OAS, and even the UN, as little more than cat's paws for U.S. policy. Certainly both organizations have served as its hand maidens in the past. Supporting the criminal sanctions against Iraq was a shameful blot on the UN's history, and the OAS should have suspended the U.S. for supporting the military coup in Venezuela.
But both organizations have independent streaks that appear to be strengthening. In any case, they are the only game in town, and the UN has scored some notable successes. It helped end the Iran-Iraq war, facilitated the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and has overseen elections in El Salvador, East Timor, and Eritrea. It also had disastrous failures in Rwanda and Bosnia. In the long run, however, it is the only serious solution to international crises.
Conn M. Hallinan is a provost at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and an analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He can be reached at <email@example.com>.